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#### Contention 1 is the Status Quo

#### US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

Koenigsknecht 12, Public History MA Candidate

[October 04, 2012, Theresa Koenigsknecht is Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, “Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia”, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/]

Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For many, unfortunately, the answer is probably “yes.” The events of 9/11, the United States government’s response to them, and an increasing public misunderstanding of Islam have created a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice towards Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim). This “unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam” is popularly known as “Islamophobia.” Whether this attitude occurs intentionally or subconsciously, this mindset has resulted in intensifying stereotypes, hate crimes, discrimination and often condones the violation of civil rights of Muslim-Americans. The Muslim community’s response to the 9/11 attacks, both initially and today, remains remarkably patriotic and supports cooperation with government authorities. Yet immediately following 9/11, Muslim-Americans, as well as those perceived to be Muslims, often endured increased suspicion from other Americans and even experienced physical violence, supposedly in retaliation for the attacks. Over a decade later, Muslims are still subjected to hate crimes, workplace discrimination, unreasonable arrest and detention, passenger profiling, verbal (especially through hate mail and internet outlets) and physical harassment and abuse. Although racism and anti-Semitism are considered socially unacceptable, ethnic profiling against Muslim-Americans is often encouraged and accepted by government authorities and popular media. Fortunately, some people are actively working to counter the rise of Islamophobia and many communities have come together showing solidarity and interfaith cooperation with their Muslim neighbors. Anyone can take steps to defeat Islamophobia by encouraging empathy for others and participating in activities that promote discussion between people of different faiths and ethnicities. More information on countering Islamophobia can be found on The Muslim Public Affairs Council website which provides helpful resources, links and workshops. It is efforts such as these that can help create an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, as opposed to fear and misunderstanding. So what does Islamophobia have to do with Guantánamo? Muslims constitute almost all of those detained there since 9/11. For that reason, although Guantánamo may not figure largely in the minds of some Americans, Islamophobia strongly influences Western culture and plays a large part in what Americans do understand about Guantánamo and its detainees. To many American’s the prevalent misconception that Islam is equivalent with terrorism unfortunately justifies the violation of Muslim’s civil liberties in the United States as well as violations of detainees’ human rights at Guantánamo. Yet, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “A Call to Courage” report states that, “by allowing and in some cases actively encouraging the fear of terrorism to divide Americans by religion, race, and belief, our political leaders are fracturing this nation’s greatest strength: its ability to integrate diverse strands into a unified whole on the basis of shared, pluralistic, democratic values.” Remembering each person’s right to civil liberties and advocating for greater awareness and knowledge can persuade people to reconsider how they view or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia.

#### These constructions create a broader state of violence against Islamic bodies and bodies that are racially marked to look like them—this manifests itself in xenophobic profiling and immigration policies

Wing 3, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law

[Spring 2003, Adrien Katherine Wing is a Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. Princeton, 1978; M.A. UCLA, 1979; J.D. Stanford, 1982. This paper was presented at the Civil Rights symposium of the Louisiana State“Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism”, <http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5987&context=lalrev&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dguantanamo%2B%2522critical%2Brace%2Btheory%2522%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C5%26as_vis%3D1#search=%22guantanamo%20critical%20race%20theory%22>, 63 La. L. Rev. (2003)]

To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an example. In the United States, I am considered African American or Black American, with the defacto second class status that designation still implies. My parents and grandparents were all considered Black, even though some of them had very light skin. The most recent white person whom we can determine is an ancestor is my great-great grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard.35 We even have members of the African American group who look white, yet are still considered part of the Black group. In South Africa, where I have taught many times, I was considered part of the historically mixed race group known as Coloured, due to my light skin, wavy hair and other characteristics. 7 During the apartheid era, this group had a buffer status between the de jure most privileged whites and the least privileged black Africans.3 " In Brazil, I learned that my same features would classify me as White, with all the defacto privileges that the designation still brings in that society.39 The pan-ethnicity term "Arab" and the religious signifier "Muslim" have been socially constructed as a synonymous "race" in the United States.4° While there are over 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide, only 15% are Arab.41 In the U.S., it is unclear, but there maybe between 4-8 million Muslims, of whom 22.4% are U.S. born and 23.8% are African American.42 There may be 3 million Arabs in the U.S., originating from 22 countries,43 and the Arab American Institute has revealed the little known fact that nearly three quarters of Arab Americans are Christians." In an important case, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Arabs can be discriminated against on account of their race. Interestingly, those who merely look like Arabs or Muslims may be racially profiled on that basis as well. The double group can thus be considered larger than the number of actual members. According to one commentator, there may be, in this country, 7 million Arabs, 8 million Muslims, and 1.6 million South Asians, Latinos, and African Americans who could look "Arab," probably at least 10 million people,46 which I think even that is a vast underestimate of the numbers of the Blacks and Latinos in America who could pass as Arab. One African American radio personality stated that French citizen Zacharias Moussaoui, native of Morocco, who may have been the twentieth September 11 hijacker, looks like "a brother from around the way.' When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims. My partner James, who is a dark brown skinned Christian African American, often wears a kufi or skull cap to express his cultural affinity for Africa. He is always taken for a Muslim, although not an Arab. Sadly, I have told my NYU student son, who can phenotypically pass for Arab, that he has to be careful when flying so that he will not be mistaken for an Arab. Dressing in the popular ghetto styled baggy pants coupled with corn rowing his hair, and the use of an Ebonics dialect,48 helps ensure that he is not racially profiled as an Arab. Of course, when he lands in New York, his failure to be able to hail a cab indicates he is clearly seen as a Black - too risky to pick up.49 These two overlapping and socially constructed-as-synonymous groups, Arabs and Muslims, have come to be regarded in some of the negative ways that have historically characterized African Americans. While Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist-they are considered potential or actual terrorists." They are forever "foreign, disloyal and imminently threatening,"'" whether they are citizens or not. Arabs and Muslims were racially profiled, victimized, and demonized as terrorists well before September 11 2 These activities have included: physical attacks by individuals and pro-Israel groups such as the Jewish Defense League; political attacks by pro-Israel lobby AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai Birth, as well as many other Democratic and Republican Party affiliated entities; blacklisting of prominent Arab American intellectuals such as Columbia professor Edward Said and Harvard professor Walid Khalidi; as well as vicious stereotypes in films and television that would not be tolerated if used to characterize other groups.53 For example, Jack Shaheen surveyed a number of movies and found the following characterizations of Arabs and Muslims: "assholes," "bastards," "camel-dicks," "pigs," "devil-worshipers," "jackels," "rats," "rag-heads," "towel-heads," "scum-buckets," "sons-of-dogs," "buzzards of the jungle," "sons-of-whores," "sons-of-unnamed goats," and "sons-of-she-camels." 4 It is difficult to imagine the movie industry applying those sorts of labels to Blacks or Jews today. Arab American campaign contributions have been returned as if Arab citizens have no right to participate in American politics 5 3 Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities have intensified during periods of high tensions in the Middle East, such as the 1980 Iran Hostage situation, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 1986 war against Libya, and the 1991 Gulf war.56 "The Supreme Court has upheld immigration laws discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race, national origin and political affiliation that would patently violate the constitution if the rights of citizens were at stake."57 The cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," Nguyen v. US.,59 Reno v American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee,6 ' Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Incorporated,6 ' and The Chinese Exclusion cases.62 The plenary power doctrine has historically provided immunity from judicial scrutiny of immigration judgments, whether by Congress or the Executive branch. Many Americans assumed the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah federal building had to be done by Arabs or Muslims, rather than by white Christian militia member Timothy McVeigh.' After that incident, even though Arabs and Muslims were not involved, draconian immigration laws were passed in 1996 which singled out those groups. 65 Unfortunately, what happened to Arabs and Muslims under these 1996 laws was not unique. According to Kevin Johnson, these laws are part of a history of attempts to stiffle dissent that includes the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s and the Palmer Raids after World War 1.66 In that period after the war, the U.S. imprisoned people for years for speaking out against the war effort.67 During the cold war Red Scare, many people lost jobs and were subject to investigation, or were even imprisoned, because of rumored association with the Communist party.6 According to Jerry Kang, "wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes. Specifically we overestimate the threat posed by racial 'others,' in WWlI, Japanese Americans; today, Arab Americans, Muslims Middle Easterners, immigrants and anyone who looks like 'them . ,9, ? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)70 made it a crime to contribute to foreign groups deemed as terrorist, and created special deportation procedures, including the formation of special courts to evaluate secret evidence. 7 ' The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 supplemented AEDPA. That act prevents federal courts from reviewing a variety of immigration cases, with very limited exceptions. 3 These two laws "either explicitly-or according to INS interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude an 'alien terrorist' under special removal proceedings,74 to summarily remove an alien who is a 'national security' risk,7 and to deny bond to aliens in removal proceedings."76 Pursuant to these statutes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported or attempted to deport more than two dozen people on the basis of secret evidence-almost all were Muslim, mainly Arabs. 77 Ironically, in 2000, Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of racial profiling when it used secret evidence.78 After September 11 the situation affecting Arabs and Muslims dramatically worsened,79 and there have been profound effects on their civil rights.8 " Before that fateful date, 80% of Americans considered racial profiling wrong.8 After September 11, the polls reversed and 60% said profiling was fine, especially if directed against Arabs and Muslims. 82 U.S. Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana likely expressed the sentiments of many when he stated on the radio, "If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked." 3 A survey done soon after September 11 said that nearly half would be in favor of having Arabs, including citizens, carry a special identification card.8 There were early reports that some Blacks and Latinos welcomed the law enforcement targeting of Arabs and Muslims.85 When I heard that comment, it reminded me that I preferred that my sons not be mistaken for Arabs when flying. On the other hand, I also realized that increased racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims has not meant that the long term racial profiling of African Americans has stopped. It merely means that my sons may be doubly profiled depending on the context. At the airport, they may be regarded as Arab terrorists, while at the taxi stand or ATM machine, they may be regarded as Black criminals.8 6 After September 11, Muslims and Arabs and people who look like them have been under siege." Over 1000 incidents of hate crimes were reported by February 2002.8 Even President Bush's Arab secret service agent was removed from an American Airlines plane. 9 Of five people who were killed, including a Sikh Indian, a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, and an Indian Hindu,9 none of them was a Muslim Arab, but all were socially constructed as such. The U.S. Justice Department opened up more than 380 investigations into violence or threats, which have taken the form of "telephone, internet, mail and face-to-face threats; minor assaults, assaults with dangerous weapons, and assaults resulting in serious injury or death; and vandalism, shootings, and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship."9 ' About 70 state and local criminal prosecutions were instigated against 80 defendants. 92 According to Bill Hing, Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not, are literally and figuratively being de-Americanized, which is "a twisted brand of xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners, but also hatred of those who may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would prefer being removed from the country anyway."93 A member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has even said that in the event of another terrorist attack, the American government might consider interning Arab Americans,"4 reminiscent of the treatment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II.9 ' The legal position of Arabs and Muslims has especially declined since the exceptionally speedy passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act),96 which subjects noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological exclusion, unilateral executive detention, and racial profiling.97 Aliens are deportable for innocent association, without any proof that they supported terrorist activity.98 Noncitizens are now subject to the resurrection of ideological exclusion, that is that they will be denied a visa on the basis of pure speech if they are seen as endorsing or espousing terroristic activity or persuading others to support activity or a group.99 Aliens can be detained without any hearing or showing that they pose a threat to national security or are a flight risk. The defendant in a normal criminal proceeding can be held without bail only if he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. " Aliens can now be held not only during the proceeding which can take years, but also afterwards, indefinitely, even if the proceeding says they should not be removed from the country!!lo Rules that effect citizens and noncitizens alike include the authorization of secret searches and wiretaps without any probable cause as would normally be required by the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 Under the USA Patriot Act, over 1000 people were held for weeks or months with no charges in mass preventive detention. 03 They did not have access to lawyers and, in many cases, their families were not told where they were."° Some people were held as material witnesses, i.e. they might have information. Even they have been treated harshly.'0 5 Some have challenged that detention in court. While federal judges have found that the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for potential testimony before a grand jury is unlawful,'0 6 otherjudges have held the opposite. 1 7 According to Jerry Kang, [we] should not be surprised if courts determine that national security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional law- a 'compelling interest' and that rude forms of racial profiling, notwithstanding its over and under-inclusiveness, are 'narrowly tailored' to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more political branches, r' Little research has been done as to how all this has affected women in the Arab and Muslim communities, as many of the men detained were the sole or major breadwinners for their families as well as respected business owners, religious leaders, and community activists." These women are usually stereotyped as voiceless and passive, needing to be liberated from the all encompassing Afghanistan burqa or even the more modest varieties of head scarves many wear in the United States."' Some of them may not speak English, may not have been working, or even had a visa to work, if foreign born." In November 2001, the Bush Justice Department said it would interview some 5000 young men, solely based on age, date of arrival, and country of origin. Virtually all were Arabs or Muslims." 2 Some police departments refused to assist the federal government as they believed the policy constituted racial profiling."' They knew that law enforcement works best if it positively involves the community rather than terrorizes it."4 Needless to say, the affected groups have been outraged by the targeting."5 Some months later, the Justice Department announced it would interview 3000 additional men from countries with an Al Qaeda presence." 6 When the Justice Department announced the Absconder Apprehension Initiative in February 2002, they decided to prioritize the deportation of 6000 aliens out of the 300,000 foreigners who remained in the country after being ordered deported. Needless to say, these men were from Arab countries." 7 In April 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would put into effect a provision from IIRIRA, which gives the police the authority to enforce immigration laws."' This was controversial not only in immigrant communities, but with police concerned about racial profiling. "'We've spent decades establishing trust... with our very diverse communities,' says a San Diego spokesman. 'If there is an immigration emergency tied to criminal activity, of course we'll assist. But if it is simply an immigration violation.., we will not be involved.""" In June 2002, the Entry-Exit Registration System was established which now requires men from age 16 up, from 25 countries including nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, to register and be photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed, or else be deported.2 Over 1200 men have been detained under this program.' For example, in December 2002, 400 men from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Syria were detained in Los Angeles under this program, and Amnesty International reported their harsh treatment included being shackled, hosed down with cold water, forced to sleep standing up, and kept from contacting family or legal counsel.'22 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has called for a dismantling of this registration system since it is "discriminatory in nature, ineffective and inefficient as a law enforcement strategy, and creates widespread ill-will in Arab American and Muslim communities across the country."'2 Of course, the inadequacy of all such profiling is shown by the fact that the airplane "shoe bomber" Richard Reid is a citizen of Great Britain;24 the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh is a Muslim convert, white upper middle class native of Main County, California; ' 25 potential "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla is a Puerto Rican, former Chicago gangbanger; 12 6 and alleged twentieth hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui, who was captured before September 11, is a citizen of France.' 7 None of them would have been identified through profiling on the basis of nationality. It is interesting to look at the disparate legal treatment of these men. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, got a public trial, whereas hundreds of foreign born Arabs and Muslims, also captured there, are being held in incommunicado detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'28 The President issued a military order that Al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be tried in military tribunals or commissions without appeal to civilian courts, an action which has been heavily criticized by various scholars,'29 as well as our allies.130 At least two federal courts have denied habeas petitions filed by lawyers representing some of the detainees, refusing to assert jurisdiction over the cases. 13 1 There may be approximately 650 suspects from 43 countries in Cuba, and officials are preparing accommodations for up to 2000 inmates.13 1 Some scholars and government officials have suggested that detention and prosecution of captured suspects should not even be governed by international law. 1 3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and others have argued that such persons could be tortured without violating any laws binding the U.S. 34 Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a former Chicago Latin Kings gang member who converted to Islam.' He was picked up by authorities as he returned from Pakistan and was allegedly planning to set off a dirty bomb containing radioactive materials. 36 He is now being held in incommunicado detention in a U.S. military prison as an "enemy combatant," without access to counsel or any court-military or civilian, and may never be tried. 1 37 In December 2002, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York judge Michael Mukasey issued a 102 page opinion affirming Padilla's right to consult counsel, but the government continues to resist the court's order. 38 Another U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana of Saudi descent, who was captured by Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, is also being held as an enemy combatant, after being discovered among the Guantanamo prisoners. 139 The U.S. government in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases is resisting petitions for habeas corpus and saying that courts should just accept the President's determinations as to their status.140 Ironically, putting U.S. citizens under military jurisdiction without access to legal counsel places them in a legal limbo where they have less rights than foreigners Reid or Moussaoui 14 1 In October 2002, Reid ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District Court in Boston. 142 In Seattle last August, an African American thirty-six year old, Earnest James Thompson, now known as James Uj aama, was accused of lending assistance to Al Qaeda by founding a training camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999.43 He was also alleged to have run a militant Islamic web site in Great Britain, and was allegedly linked to Abou Hamza Masri, a London Muslim and alleged recruiter for Bin Laden.'" Investigators hope to "squeeze some information out of him, "and he is being tried in a civilian court.145 In March 2003, the INS was dissolved and folded into the new Department of Homeland Security along with 21 other federal agencies. The implications are ominous, as one commentator has stated. "Placing all of the INS's functions into a department focused primarily on national security suggests that the United States no longer views immigrants as welcome contributors, but as potential threats viewed through a terrorist lens."'146 At the time of this writing, it is alleged that the U.S. government has drafted in secret Patriot II, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.147 The proposed law would authorize secret arrests, overturning the federal court decision requiring the government to release the names of all those detained since September 11. 148 Additionally, the law would permit the U.S. to extradite even American citizens for trial to countries with which we do not have extradition treaties, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, which are well known for torture. 149 International and current U.S. law prohibit sending a person to a country where there is likelihood of torture. 50 Constituting a new level of invasion of privacy, a proposed Terrorist Identification database would authorize the collection of DNA of any suspect and of all noncitizens suspected of having an association with a "terrorist organization."'' The most extraordinary proposal would possibly strip Americans of citizenship as a form of punishment for giving material support to terrorist groups.15 2

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy—notions of western superiority are a critical tool to drum up support for militaristic and elitist interventions in poor countries

Kumar 13

[09/11/13, Deepa Kumar is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and Middle Eastern Studies at the Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization, and the UPS Strike being interviewed by Jessica Desvarieux, The Real News Network, “Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High”, http://truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high]

KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

#### We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

#### Centering our praxis in this space is key—interrogating islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology

[Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1]

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamphobia is critical to establish a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies

[2004, Jasmin Zine is a researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate courses in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism education and critical ethnography., “Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines”, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3]

As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

#### Everything we do, everything we read forms us as subjects as the world – social change cannot be effected unless there is a vocabulary to construct subjects that engage in a new way of knowing – the alt is a formation of new ethical subjects – the affirmative solidifies dominant structures and knowledges that actively prevent ethics

-necessary to create a new social vocabulary around issues to effect real change

-we are constantly being constructed as subjects by the experiences we have

-on an individual level, ethics is a processing of attuning your ways of knowing the world and relating to the world to be more compassionate and open

-the way our self exists is inseparable from our relationship to the world

-this breaks processes of solidifying existing ways of knowing and mainstream institutions – the affirmative is a step in a long, long process of normalization to make the self complicit with and accepting of violence and inequality – the act of criticism in our alternative is an act of interruption that ethically attunes the self to the hidden violence of dominant knowledges

- we construct the way we interact with the law with reference to this reality

Scott 9 – prof of philosophy @ Vanderbilt

(Charles, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34: 350–367, Foucault, Genealogy, Ethics)

In Foucault’s analysis of the May 1968 uprising in France, he said that even though “things were coming apart” there did not “exist any vocabulary capable of expressing that process” (Foucault, 2000, 271). We could say on Foucault’s terms that there did not exist a way of knowing (a subject of knowledge) and the language and concepts suited for the complex event of France’s transformation. A momentous event happened without adequate “tools” for its recognition, analysis, and appropriation. Consequently, in the following dispersion of quarreling groups and political factions, the 1968 crisis did not at first become an effective discursive event that opened up a full range of apparent problems and transformations for formal knowledge. That would require a knowing subject that was turned away from the strongest discursive options, such as those of the current Humanists, Marxists, Maoists, French colonialists, and French cultural supremacists. So much was falling apart in France at the time that a subject of knowledge was needed that formed in the interconnecting French crises, a subject informed by marginal experiences in comparison to the experiences recognized by the dominant discourses, marginalized experiences like those of Algerian soldiers, French prisoners, people oppressed by French colonialism, people hammered down by Stalin’s communism or the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, and people in highly energized, non-French cultures: a subject that developed with the voices and experiences that were on the margins of the older and authoritative French way of life.¶ In spite of the stammering and stumbling in its aftermath, however, May, 1968 opened an opportunity for a new “vocabulary,” a new discourse, and a new ethos for recognizing and knowing. Its event made possible a transitional and transformative knowing subject whose relative freedom and lack of establishment constituted a major, constructive epistemic difference from the accepted discourses. Much more could be said on this issue, but my present, limited points are that in the context of Foucault’s thought, transformation of the knowing subject constitutes an ethical event; and ethics on an individual level takes place as people work on themselves to be able to change themselves enough to know differently and to transform what is evident about others (Foucault, 2000, 241–2).14 These two kinds of transformation take place in genealogical knowing as Foucault conceives and practices it.¶ Two different senses for ethics are at work here. One sense refers to ways of life that are constituted by discourses, institutions, and practices—by all manner of power formations that are not authored by singular individuals and that are ingrained in people’s lives inclusive of their judgment, knowledge, and codes of behavior. A society, of course, can have a variety of overlapping or competing ways of life, a variety of ethical environments, and changes in these environments would compose ethical changes in this broad sense of “ethical.” The knowledge that genealogy generates comprises a different discourse from many established ones and puts in question many aspects of Western society, especially around the topics of madness, sex, crime, normalcy, social/political suppression of people, and mechanisms of regulation and control. It challenges significant parts of our social environment, encourages deliberation and critique, and intends to make a differential impact on contemporary ways of life. In addition to his writing, Foucault was active in many causes designed to change political and social formations and to have a broad social impact. He played a leading role, for example, in support of Vietnamese boat people who were fleeing from persecution and being ignored by Western governments. He was active in prison reform movements. He spoke out against what he found to be unacceptable injustices in Poland and equally unacceptable silence in their regard in the West, against a Realpolitik that ignores suppression of people and their liberties in countries other than one’s own. He showed in multiple ways that passionate support of institutional transformation and of suppressed and suffering people can be carried out without Humanism or other forms of universalizing or totalizing discourse.¶ A second sense of ethics for Foucault means a work on the self by the self.15 He understood, for example, his writing (and his interviews) as processes of self-formation: “I haven’t written a single book that was not inspired, at least in part, by a direct personal experience,” an experience that he wants to understand better by finding a different vocabulary, changed combinations of concepts, and the mutations they bring by connecting with aspects of experience that are barely emerging at the borders of his awareness (Foucault, 2000, 244). His books, he says, compose experiences inclusive of his own “metamorphosis” as he writes them and comes to a transformed connection with their topics. He would also like for his books to provide readers with something akin to his experience, to bring us to our limits of sense where transformations can occur (Foucault, 2000, 244). The sense of ethics in this case is focused by individual experiences and the care they exercise in connecting with them. In care for themselves, they work at maintaining or altering their behavior and attitudes to appropriate themselves to their experiences.16 Foucault says that his books are “like invitations and public gestures” to join in the book’s process, a process that he finds transformative of aspects of contemporary life and potentially, should individuals join in, transformative of the way they understand and connect with themselves (Foucault, 2000, 245–6).¶ Care for self has a very long lineage that Foucault spent his last years investigating. Indeed, understanding himself without metaphysical help or universalized solutions was one aspect of his caring self-relation. He carried out a project, deeply rooted in a Western tradition that makes caring for oneself inseparable from the ways one knows oneself, the world, and others. In his own process, he finds repeated instances of change in his self-world relation as he experiences the impact of what he is coming to know at the borders of his knowledge and identity. When these boundary-experiences (he calls them limit-experiences) occur, he says, the clarity of some aspects of his identity dies in the impact of what he is coming to find. His affections and behavior often change. As an author he attempts to write into his books these very processes for the reader’s possible engagement.¶ If I find through one of his books, for example, a way of knowing that makes clear some of the dangers inherent in a well-established body of knowledge or a mainstream institution, I have an opportunity for assessing those dangers and choosing how I will connect with them and my experience of them. I might find that what I know and the way I know are violated by what Foucault’s work shows. I might find his approach and the knowledge that it offers highly questionable or irrelevant for my life. I might experience new questions, a need for change, an unexpected dissatisfaction with what I have been accepting as true and good. If Foucault’s works carry out their intention and if I read them carefully, I am engaged in an experience that he found transformative and that will make room for choices and problems that I can experience and that might bring me to an edge where what I know meets a limit and the possibility for an altered discourse and subjectivity. Coming in this way to an edge, a limit of the way I know and who I am in such knowing brings together the epistemic and personal aspects of ethical experience. The very act of caring for myself in this instance interrupts the subliminal processes of normalization and sets in motion another kind of dynamics as I come to the limits of my “authorized” experience and the emergence of a different kind of experience. I am caring for myself, impacting my own affections, values, and way of knowing. The dynamics of what Foucault calls biopower (the powerful complex of social forces that regulate human behavior by means of, for example, health care delivery, education, and moral legislation in both broad and “corpuscular” ways) are interrupted by a different dynamics that builds individual autonomy. Self-caring instead of the anonymous dynamics of normalization begins to form my self’s relation to itself. How will I appropriate the experience of limits and their transgression by emerging “voices”, realities, and intensities? Who shall I be in their impact? How will I present myself to myself and my environment should I affirm what is happening in the margins of my established identity?

## 2AC

**T**

**W/M**

**We meet --- we call for a critical praxis against indefinite detention policies --- EVEN IF not advocating government action it preserves discussion and predictability which *severely mitigates their offense***

**Restriction is a limitation**

STATE OF **ARIZONA**, Appellee, **v.** JEREMY RAY **WAGNER**, April 10, **2008**, Filed, Appellant., 1 CA-CR 06-0167, 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613, opinion by Judge G. MURRAY SNOW

P10 **The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature** for the purposes of the DUI statutes. See generally A.R.S. § 28-1301 (2004) (providing the "[d]efinitions" section of the DUI statutes). **In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to ordinary dictionary definitions and do not construe the word as being a term of art.** Lee v. State, 215 Ariz. 540, 544, ¶ 15, 161 P.3d 583, 587 (App. 2007) ("When a statutory term is not explicitly defined, we assume, unless otherwise stated, that the Legislature intended to accord the word its natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition.").

P11 **The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification."** **Black's Law Dictionary** 1341 (8th ed. 1999). In fact, "limited" and "restricted" are considered synonyms. See Webster's II New Collegiate Dictionary 946 (2001). Under these commonly accepted definitions, **Wagner's driving privileges were "restrict[ed]" when they were "limited" by the ignition interlock requirement**. **Wagner was not only** [\*7] **statutorily required to install an ignition interlock** device on all of the vehicles he operated, A.R.S. § 28-1461(A)(1)(b), **but he was also prohibited from driving any vehicle that was not equipped with such a device,** regardless whether he owned the vehicle or was under the influence of intoxicants, A.R.S. § 28-1464(H). **These limitations constituted a restriction on Wagner's privilege to drive**, for he was unable to drive in circumstances which were otherwise available to the general driving population. Thus, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

**We meet or nobody does --- framing is tied to policy**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

**C/I**

**Counter-interp—a discussion of the topic vs. a topical discussion—if we center our argument in relation to the topic, it solves their offense**

**Our method stops capitalist exploitation --- things like Citizens United only occur because of a failure of bottom-up democracy**

**Al Gore 13** (2013, He Created the Series of Tubez we call the Internets, *The Future*, Chapter 3 on Kindle edition) \*Gender modified

WITH A TIGHTLY INTEGRATED GLOBAL ECONOMY AND A PLANET-WIDE digital network, we are witnessing the birth of the world’s first truly global civilization. As knowledge and economic power are multiplied and dispersed far more widely and swiftly than by the Print and Industrial Revolutions, the political equilibrium of the world is undergoing a massive change on a scale not seen since the decades following Europe’s linkage by sea routes to the Americas and Asia 500 years ago. As a result, the balance of power among nations is changing dramatically. Just as the Industrial Revolution led to the dominance of the world economy by Western Europe and the United States, the emergence of Earth Inc. is shifting economic power from West to East and spreading it to the new growth economies developing throughout the world. China, in particular, is overtaking the U.S. as the center of gravity in the global economy. More importantly, just as nation-states emerged as the dominant form of political organization in the wake of the printing press, the emergence of the Global Mind is changing many of the social and political assumptions on which the nation-state system was based. Some of the sources of power traditionally wielded primarily by nations are no longer as firmly under their exclusive control. While our individual political identities remain primarily national, and will for a long time to come, the simultaneous globalization of information and markets is transferring power once reserved for national governments to private actors— including multinational corporations, networked entrepreneurs, and billions of individuals in the global middle class. No nation can escape these powerful waves of change by unilaterally imposing its own design. The choices most relevant to our future are now ones that confront the world as a whole. But because nation-states retain the exclusive power to negotiate policies and implement them globally, the only practical way to reclaim control of our destiny is to seek a global consensus within the community of nations to secure the implementation of policies that protect human values. And since the end of World War II— at least until recently— most of the world has looked primarily to the United States of America for leadership when facing the need for such a consensus. Many fear, however, that the ability of the U.S. to provide leadership in the world is declining in relative terms. In 2010, China became the world’s leading manufacturing nation, ending a period of U.S. leadership that had lasted for 110 years. An economic historian at Nuffield College, Oxford, Robert Allen, said this milestone marked the “closing of a 500-year cycle in economic history.” When China’s overall economic strength surpasses that of the United States later this decade, it will mark the first time since 1890 that any economy in the world has been larger than the American economy. Worse, **not since the 1890s has** **U.S. government decision making been as** feeble, **dysfunctional,** **and** **servile to corporate** and other **special interests** **as** it is **now**. **The** **gravity of the danger** **posed by this** **debasement of American democracy** **is** still **not widely understood.** The **subordination of reason-based analysis** **to** the **influence of wealth and power** in U.S. decision making **has led to** **catastrophically bad policy choices**, sclerotic decision making, and a significant weakening of U.S. influence in the world. Even a relative decline in the preeminence of the U.S. position in the world system has significant consequences. It remains “the indispensable nation” in reducing the potential for avoidable conflicts— keeping the sea lanes open, monitoring and countering terrorist groups, and playing a balancing role in tense regions like the Middle East and East Asia, and in regions (like Europe) that could face new tensions without strong U.S. leadership. Among its many other roles, the United States has also exercised responsibility for maintaining relative stability in the world’s international monetary system and has organized responses to periodic market crises. At the moment, though, the **degradation of the U.S. political system is causing a** dangerous **deficit of governance** **in the world system** and a gap between the problems that need to be addressed and the vision and cooperation necessary to address them. This is the real fulcrum in the world’s balance of power today— and it is badly in need of repair. **In the absence of strong U.S. leadership, the community of nations is** apparently **no longer able to coalesce in support of international coordination and agreements** that establish the cooperative governance arrangements necessary for the solution of global problems. Meetings of the G20 (which now commands more attention than the G8) have become little more than a series of annual opportunities for the leaders of its component nations to issue joint press releases. Their habit of wearing matching colorful shirts that represent the fashion motif of the host nation recalls the parable of the child who noticed that the emperor has no clothes. Except in this case, the clothes have no emperor. Largely **because** of **U.S**. government **decisions** to **follow the lead of powerful domestic corporate interests**, once-hopeful **multilateral negotiations**— like the Doha Round of trade talks (commenced in 2001) and the Kyoto Protocol (commenced in 1997)— **are** now sometimes characterized as **“zombies.”** That is, they are **neither alive nor dead; they just stagger around and scare people**. Similarly, the Law of the Sea Treaty is in a condition of stasis. The **global institutions established** with U.S. leadership **after W**orld **W**ar **II**— **the U**nited **N**ations, **the World Bank**, **the I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und, **and the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)— **are** now largely **ineffective because** of the global changes that have shaken the geopolitical assumptions upon which **they were based**. Chief am**on**g them was **the assumption that the U.S. would provide** global **leadership**. So long as the United States offered the vision necessary for these institutions— and so long as most of the world trusted that U.S. leadership would move the world community in a direction that benefited all— these institutions often worked well. If any nation’s goals are seen as being motivated by the pursuit of goals that are in the interest of all, its political power is greatly enhanced. By contrast, **if the nation offering leadership** to the world **is seen as** primarily **promoting its own narrower interests**— the commercial prospects **of its corporations, for example**— its **capacity for leadership is diminished**. Two thirds of a century after their birth, these multilateral institutions face criticism from developing countries, environmentalists, and advocates for the poor because of what many see as “democratic deficits.” Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund require support from 85 percent of the voting rights held by member nations. Since the United States alone has more than 15 percent of the voting rights in both organizations, it has effective veto power over their decisions. Similarly, some countries ask why France and the United Kingdom are still among only five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council when Brazil, with a GDP larger than either, and India, whose GDP is greater than both combined and will soon be the most populous country in the world, are not. The **significant loss of confidence in U.S. leadership**, especially **since the economic crisis** of 2007– 08, has **accelerated the shift in** the equilibrium of **power in the world**. Some experts predict the emergence of a new equilibrium with both the United States and China sharing power at its center; some have already preemptively labeled it the “G2.” RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE DECLINE? Other experts predict an unstable, and more dangerous, multipolar world. It seems most likely that the increasing integration of global markets and information flows will lead to an extended period of uncertainty before global power settles into a new more complex equilibrium that may not be defined by poles of power at all. The old division of the world into rich nations and poor nations is changing as many formerly poor nations now have faster economic growth rates than the wealthy developed nations. As the gap closes between these fast-growing developing and emerging economies on the one hand and the wealthy mature economies on the other, economic and political power are not only shifting from West to East, but are also being widely dispersed throughout the world: to São Paulo, Mumbai, Jakarta, Seoul, Taipei, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Lagos, Mexico City, Singapore, and Beijing. Whatever new equilibrium of power emerges, its configuration will be determined by the resolution of several significant uncertainties about the future of the United States, China, and nation-states generally: First, is the United States really in a period of decline? If so, can the decline be reversed? And if not, is it merely relative to that of other nations, or is there a danger of an absolute decline? Second, is China likely to continue growing at its current rate or are there weaknesses in the foundations on which its prosperity is being built? Finally, are nation-states themselves losing relative power in the age of Earth Inc. and the Global Mind? There is a lively dispute among scholars about whether the United States is in decline at all. The loss of U.S. geopolitical power has been a recurring theme for far longer than many Americans realize. Even before the U.S. became the most powerful nation, there were episodic warnings that American power was waning. Some argue that concerns about China overtaking the United States in forms of power other than economic output represent just another example of what happened when so many were concerned about Japan Inc. in the 1970s and 1980s— and even earlier concerns when the former Soviet Union was seen as a threat to U.S. dominance in the 1950s and 1960s. For more than a decade following World War II, many strategic thinkers worried that the U.S. was in danger of quickly falling from the pinnacle of world power. When the USSR acquired nuclear weapons and tightened its grip on Eastern and Central Europe, these fears grew. When Sputnik was launched in 1957, making the USSR the first nation in space, the warning bells rung by declinists were heard even more loudly. Many of the alarms currently being sounded about the decline of U.S. power are based on a comparison between our present difficulties and a misremembered sense of how completely the U.S. dominated global decision making in the second half of the twentieth century. A more realistic and textured view would take into account the fact that there was never a golden age in which U.S. designs were implemented successfully without resistance and multiple failures. It is also worth remembering that while the U.S. share of global economic output fell from 50 percent in the late 1940s to roughly 25 percent in the early 1970s, it has remained at that same level for the last forty years. The rise of China’s share of global GDP and the economic strength of other emerging and developing economies has come largely at the expense of Europe, not the United States. The rise of the United States as the dominant global power began early in the twentieth century when it first became the world’s largest economy, when President Theodore Roosevelt aggressively asserted U.S. diplomatic and military power, and when it played the crucial role in determining the outcome of World War I under President Woodrow Wilson. And of course after providing the decisive economic and military strength to defeat the Axis powers in World War II, the United States emerged as the victor in both the European and Pacific theaters and was recognized as the leading power in the world. The economies of the European nations had been devastated and exhausted by the war. Those of Japan and Germany had been destroyed. The Soviet Union, having suffered casualties 100 times greater than those of the United States, had been weakened. Whatever antithetical moral authority it might have once aspired to under Lenin had been long since destroyed by Stalin’s 1939 pact with Hitler and his exceptional cruelty and brutality toward his own people. Moving quickly, the United States provided crucial leadership to establish the postwar institutions for world order and global governance. These included the Bretton Woods Agreement, which formalized the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, and a series of regional military self-defense alliances, the most important of which was NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By using foreign aid and generous trade agreements that provided access to U.S. markets, the United States grew into an even more dominant role. And the United States promoted democratic capitalism throughout the noncommunist parts of the world.

It catalyzed the emergence of European economic and political integration by midwifing the European Coal and Steel Community (which later evolved into the Common Market and the European Union). And the visionary and generous Marshall Plan lifted the nations of Europe that had been devastated by World War II to prosperity and encouraged a commitment to democracy and regional integration. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who was described by FDR as “the father of the United Nations,” was an advocate of freer reciprocal cross-border trade in Europe and the world, arguing that “when goods cross borders, armies do not.” By presiding over the reconstruction, democratization, and demilitarization of Japan, the United States also solidified its position as the dominant power in Asia. In 1949, when the Soviet Union became the world’s second nuclear power and China embraced communism after the victory of Mao Zedong, the four-decade Cold War imposed its own dynamic on the operations of the world system. The nuclear standoff between the U.S. and the USSR was accompanied by a global struggle between two ideologies with competing designs for the organization of both politics and economics. For several decades, the structure of the world’s equilibrium of power was defined by the constant tension between these two polar opposites. At one pole, the United States led an alliance of nations that included the recovering democracies of Western Europe and a reconstructed Japan, all of whom advocated the ideology of democratic capitalism. At the other pole, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics led a captive group of nations in Central and Eastern Europe in advocating the ideology of communism. This abbreviated description belies more complex dynamics, of course, but virtually every political and military conflict in the world was shaped by this larger struggle. When the Soviet Union was unable to compete with the economic strength of the United States (and was unable to adapt its command economy and authoritarian political culture to the early stages of the Information Revolution), it imploded. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union two years later (when Russia itself withdrew from the USSR), communism disappeared from the world as a serious ideological competitor. U.S. HEGEMONY IN the world thus reached its peak, and the ideology of democratic capitalism spread so widely that one political philosopher speculated that we were seeing “the end of history”— implying that no further challenge to either democracy or capitalism was likely to emerge. This ideological and political victory secured for the United States universal recognition as the dominant power in what appeared to be, at least for a brief period, a unipolar world. But once again, the superficial label concealed complex changes that accompanied the shift in the power equilibrium. Well before the beginning of World War II, Soviet communism had run afoul of **a basic truth about power** that was clearly **understood by the founders of the U**nited **S**tates: **when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one or a small group of people, it corrupts their judgment and their humanity**. **American democracy**, by contrast, **was based on** a sophisticated understanding of human nature, the **superior quality of decision making** to be **found in** what is now sometimes called **the wisdom of crowds**, and **lessons learned from the history of the Roman Republic** **about** the **dangers** posed **to liberty by centralized power**. **Unhealthy concentrations of power were** recognized to be **detrimental to the survival of freedom**. So power was separated into competing domains designed to check and balance one another in order to maintain a safe equipoise within which individuals could maintain their freedom to speak, worship, and assemble freely. The ability of any nation to persuade others to follow its leadership is often greatly influenced by its moral authority. In the case of the United States, it is undeniably true that since the ratification of its Constitution and Bill of Rights in 1790– 91, its founding principles have resonated in the hearts and minds of people throughout the world, no matter the country in which they live. Since the end of the eighteenth century, there have been three waves of democracy that spread throughout the world. The first, in the aftermath of the American Revolution, produced twenty-nine democracies. When the Great Liberator, Simón Bolívar, led democratic revolutions in South America in the two decades after America’s founding, he carried a picture of George Washington in his breast pocket. This was followed by a period of decline that shrank the number to twelve by the beginning of World War II. After 1945, the second wave of democratization swelled the number of democracies to thirty-six, but once again this expansion was followed by a decline to thirty from 1962 until the mid-1970s. The third wave began in the mid-1970s and then accelerated with the collapse of communism in 1989. The **struggle within the U**nited **S**tates **over** **policies that promote** the higher **values reflected in the** U.S. **Constitution**— individual rights, for example— **has** often **been lost to** the **interests of business** and calculations of realpolitik. When Western European countries began to grant independence to their overseas colonies and pull back from the spheres of influence they had established during their imperial periods, the United States partially filled the resulting power vacuums by extending aid and forming economic, political, and military relationships with many of the newly independent nations. When the United States feared that the withdrawal of France from its colonial role in Vietnam might lead to the expansion of what some mistakenly viewed as a quasi-monolithic communist sphere, this misunderstanding of Ho Chi Minh’s fundamentally nationalist motivation contributed to the tragic miscalculation that resulted in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in spite of its strategic mistake in Vietnam (following the earlier long and costly stalemate in the Korean War), heavy-handed military interventions in Latin America, and other difficult challenges, the U.S. consolidated its position of leadership in the world. The unprecedented growth of U.S. prosperity in the decades following World War II— along with its continued advocacy of freedom— made it an aspirational model for other countries. It is difficult to imagine that human rights and self-determination could have made as much progress throughout the world in the post– World War II era without the U.S. being in a dominant position. More recently, the spread of democracy has slowed. Since the market crisis of 2007– 08, there has been a decline in the number of democratic nations in the world and a degradation in the quality and extent of democracy in several others— including the United States. But even though the world is still in a “democratic recession,” some believe that the Arab Spring and other Internet-empowered democratic movements may signal the beginning of a fourth wave of democratization, though the results are still ambiguous at best. In any case, it is premature to predict an absolute decline in U.S power. Among positive signs that the United States may yet slow its relative decline, the U.S. university system is still far and away the best in the world. Its venture investment culture continues to make the U.S. the greatest source of innovation and creativity. Although the U.S. military budget is lower as a percentage of GDP than it has been for most of the post– World War II era, it has increased in absolute terms to the highest level since 1945. The U.S. military is still by far the most powerful, best trained (by the best officer corps), best equipped, and most lavishly financed armed force the world has ever seen. Its annual budget is equal to the combined military budgets of the next fifty militaries in the world and almost equal to the military spending of the entire rest of the world put together. AS SOMEONE WHO was frequently described as a pro-defense Democrat during my service in the Congress and in the White House, I have seen how valuable it has been for the United States and for the cause of freedom to maintain unquestioned military superiority. However, after more than a decade of fighting two seemingly endless wars, while simultaneously maintaining large deployments in Europe and Asia, U.S. military resources are strained to the point of breaking. And the relative decline of America’s economic power and wealth is beginning to force the reconsideration of such large military budgets. The same global trends that have dispersed productive activity throughout Earth Inc. and connected people throughout the world to the Global Mind are also dispersing technologies relevant to warfare, which used to be monopolized by nation-states. The ability to launch destructive cyberattacks, for example, is now being widely spread on the Internet. Some of the means of waging violent warfare are being robosourced and outsourced. The use of drones and other semiautonomous robotic weapons proliferated dramatically during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force now trains more pilots for unmanned vehicles than it trains pilots of manned fighter jets. (Interestingly, the drone pilots suffer post-traumatic stress disorder at the same rate as fighter pilots even though they see their targets over a television screen thousands of miles away.) On several occasions, drones have been hacked by the forces they are targeting. In 2010, intelligence analysts found that Islamic militants in Iraq used commercially available software selling for $ 26 to hack into the unencrypted video signals coming from U.S. drones and watch the same video in real time that was being sent to the U.S. controllers back in the United States. In Afghanistan, insurgent forces were able to do the same thing, and at the end of 2011, Iran hacked into the control system of a U.S. stealth drone and commanded it to land on an airstrip in Kashmar, Iran. A new generation of robotic weapons in the air, on the land, and in the sea is being rapidly developed. More than fifty countries are now experimenting with semiautonomous military robots of their own. (A new legal doctrine of “robot rights” has been developed by U.S. military lawyers to give unmanned drones and robots the legal right to unleash deadly fire when threatened, just as a fighter pilot has the right to fire at a potential attacker as soon as he is alerted to the fact that a targeting radar has “lit up” his plane.) At the same time, some dangerous combat missions are being outsourced. During the war in Iraq, the United States shifted significant operations in the war zone to private contractors.\* After the unpopular Vietnam War, the United States abandoned the draft and has since relied on a professional volunteer army— which many claim emotionally insulates the American people from some of the impact wars used to have on the general population. THE CHINA ISSUE Meanwhile, China’s military budgets— while still only a fraction of U.S. defense spending— are increasing. Yet there are questions about the sustainability of China’s present economic buildup. Many feel that it is premature to predict a future in which China becomes the dominant global power, or even occupies the center of a new power equilibrium alongside the United States, because they doubt that the social, political, and economic foundations in China are durable. In spite of the economic progress in China, experts warn that the lack of free speech, the concentrated autocratic power in Beijing, and the high levels of corruption throughout China’s political and economic system raise questions about the sustainability of its recent growth rates. For example, at the end of 2010, there were an estimated 64 million empty apartments in China. The building bubble there has been attributed to a number of causes, but for several years visitors have remarked upon the large number of subsidized high-rise apartment buildings that spring up quickly and remain unoccupied for very long periods of time. According to research by Morgan Stanley, almost 30 percent of the windmills constructed by China are not connected to the electrical grid; many have been placed in remote locations with strong winds but no economical way to extend the grid to them. China’s success in building its capacity to construct renewable energy systems of low cost has been of benefit to China and to the global market, but as with the many empty apartment buildings, the idle windmills serve as a warning that some trends in the Chinese economic miracle may not continue at the same pace. China’s banking system suffers from the same distortions of state manipulation. Some state-owned banks are recycling their allocations of credit into black market lending at usurious and unsustainable interest rates. There are also questions about China’s social and political cohesion during what has already been a disruptive economic transition, accompanied by the largest internal migration in history and horrendous levels of pollution. Although precise statistics are hard to verify, a professor at Tsinghua University, Sun Liping, estimated that in 2010 there were “180,000 protests, riots and other mass incidents.” That number reflects a fourfold increase from 2000.

Numerous other reports confirm that social unrest appears to be building in response to economic inequality, intolerable environmental conditions, and opposition to property seizures and other abuses by autocratic local and regional leaders. Partly as a result of dissatisfaction and unrest— particularly among internal migrant workers— wages have been increasing significantly in the last two years. Some scholars have cautioned against a Western bias in prematurely predicting instability in countries whose governments do not gain democratic legitimacy. In China, according to some experts, legitimacy can be and is derived from other sources besides the participatory nature of their system. Since Confucian times, legitimacy has been gained in the eyes of the governed when the policies implemented are successful and when the persons placed in positions of power are seen to have earned their power in a form of meritocracy and demonstrate sufficient wisdom to seem well chosen. IT IS PRECISELY these sources of legitimacy that are now most at risk in the United States. The **sharp decline of public trust in government at all levels**— and public trust in most all large institutions— **is based in** large measure on the **perception that they are all failing to produce successful policies and outcomes**. **The previous prominence of reason-based decision making in the U.S. democratic system was its greatest source of strength.** The ability of the United States, with only 5 percent of the world’s people, to lead the world for as long as it has is due in no small measure to the creativity, boldness, and effectiveness of its decision making in the past. Ironically, the economic growth in China since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, launched in 1978, were brought about not only by his embrace of a Chinese form of capitalism but also by his intellectual victory within the Chinese Central Committee in advocating reason-based analysis as the justification for abandoning stale communist economic dogma— and his political skill in portraying this dramatic shift as simply a reaffirmation of Maoist doctrine. In a speech to the All-Army Conference in the year his reforms were begun, Deng said, “Isn’t it true that seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality and integrating theory with practice form the fundamental principle of Mao Zedong Thought?” One reason for the rise of the United States over its first two centuries to the preeminent position among nations was that American democracy demonstrated a genius for “seeking truth from facts.” Over time, it produced better decisions and policies to promote its national interests than the government of any other nation. The **robust debate that takes place when democratic institutions are healthy and functioning well results in more creative and visionary initiatives than any other system of government has proven capable of producing.** Unfortunately, however, the U.S. no longer has a well-functioning self-government. To use a phrase common in the computer software industry, **American democracy has been hacked**. The United States **Congress**, the avatar of the democratically elected national legislatures in the modern world, **is** now **incapable of passing laws without permission from the corporate lobbies** and other special interests **that control their campaign finances**. THE LONG REACH OF CORPORATIONS **It is** now **common for** lawyers representing **corporate lobbies** **to sit in the actual drafting sessions where legislation is written**, **and** **to provide the precise language for new laws** intended **to remove obstacles to their corporate business plans**— usually **by weakening provisions of existing laws and regulations intended to** **protect** the **public interest** **against** documented **excesses and abuses**. Many U.S. **state legislatures** often now **routinely rubber-stamp laws** **that have been** **written in their entirety by corporate lobbies**. **Having served as an elected official** in the federal government **for the last quarter of the twentieth century, and** having **observed it** closely before that period and **since**, **I have** **felt** **a sense of** **shock** and dismay **at** **how quickly the integrity and efficacy of American democracy has nearly collapsed**. There have been other periods in American history when wealth and corporate power have dominated the operations of government, but there are reasons for concern that **this may be more than a cyclical phenomenon**— particularly recent **court decisions** that **institutionalize the dominance and control of wealth and corporate power**. This **crippling of democracy comes at a time of sweeping and tumultuous change in the world system**, **when the need for U.S. advocacy of democratic principles and human values has never been greater.** The **crucial decisions facing the world are unlikely to be made well**, or at all, **without** **bold and creative U.S. leadership**. **It is** therefore **especially important to restore the integrity of U.S. democracy**. But in order to do so, **it is necessary to** **accurately diagnose how it went so badly off track**. The **shift of power from democracy to** markets and **corporations has a long history**. The **shift of power from democracy to** markets and **corporations has a long history**. In general, political freedom and economic freedom have reinforced one another. The new paradigm born in the era of the printing press was based on the principle that individuals had dignity, and when armed with the free flow of information could best chart their own destinies in both the political and economic realms by aggregating their collective wisdom through regular elections of representatives, and through the “invisible hand” of supply and demand. Throughout history, capitalism has been more conducive to higher levels of political and religious freedom than any other way of organizing economic activity. But internal tensions in the compound ideology of democratic capitalism have always been present and frequently difficult to reconcile. Just as **America’s founders feared** concentrated political power, many of them also worried about the impact on democracy of **too much concentrated economic power**— particularly in the form of corporations. The longest running corporation was created in Sweden in 1347, though the legal form did not become common until the seventeenth century, when the Netherlands and the United Kingdom allowed a proliferation of corporate charters, especially for the exploitation of trade to and from their new overseas colonies. After a series of spectacular frauds and other abuses, including the South Sea Company scandal (which gave birth to the economic concept of a “bubble”), England banned corporations in 1720. (The prohibition was not lifted until 1825 when the Industrial Revolution required the capitalization of railway companies and other new firms to exploit emerging technologies.) The **American revolutionaries** were keenly aware of this history and **originally chartered corporations** mostly **for civic and charitable purposes**, **and only for limited periods of time**. Business corporations came later, in response to the need to raise capital for industrialization. Referring to the English experience, **Thomas Jefferson wrote** in a letter to U.S. Senator George Logan of Pennsylvania in 1816, “**I hope we** shall take warning from the example and **crush** in its birth **the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare** already **to challenge our government** to a trial of strength **and bid defiance to the laws of our country**.” Between 1781 and 1790 the number of corporations expanded by an order of magnitude, from 33 to 328. Then in 1811, New York State enacted the first of many statutes that allowed the proliferation of corporations without specific and narrow limitations imposed by government. So long as the vast majority of Americans lived and worked on farms, corporations remained relatively small and their impact on the conditions of labor and the quality of life was relatively limited. But **during the Civil War**, corporate power increased considerably with the mobilization of Northern industry, huge government procurement contracts, and the building of the railroads. In the years following the war, **the corporate role in American life grew quickly**, **and** the **efforts by corporations to take control of** the **decisions in Congress and state legislatures grew as well**. **The tainted election of** 18**76** (deadlocked on election night by disputed electoral votes in the state of Florida) **was**, according to historians, **settled in** **secret negotiations** **in which** **corporate wealth and power played the decisive role**, **setting the stage for** a period of corrupt deal making that eventually led the new president, **Rutherford** B. **Hayes**, **to complain that “this is** a government of the people, by the people and for the people no longer. It is **a government of corporations, by corporations, and for corporations**.” As the Industrial Revolution began to reshape America, industrial accidents became commonplace. Between 1888 and 1908, 700,000 American workers were killed in industrial accidents— approximately 100 every day. In addition to providing brutal working conditions, employers also held wages as low as possible. Efforts by employees to obtain relief from these abuses by organizing strikes and seeking the passage of protective legislation provoked a fierce reaction from corporate owners. Private police forces brutalized those attempting to organize labor unions and lawyers and lobbyists flooded the U.S. Capitol and state legislatures. **When corporations began hiring lobbyists to influence** the **writing of laws**, **the initial reaction was** one of **disgust**. **In 1853, the** U.S. **Supreme Court** voided and made unenforceable a contingency contract involving lobbying— in part because those providing the money did so in secret. The **justices concluded** that such **lobbying was** **harmful to public policy** **because it** “**tends to corrupt** or contaminate, by improper influences, **the integrity of our  …   political institutions**” **and** “sully the purity or **mislead the judgments** **of those to whom the** **high trust of legislation is confided**” **with** “undue influences” that have “all the injurious **effects of** a **direct fraud on the public**.” Twenty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question once again, invalidating contingency contracts for lobbyists with these words: “If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment as infamous. If the instances were numerous, open and tolerated, they would be regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the times.” The state of Georgia’s new constitution explicitly banned the lobbying of legislators. Nevertheless, the “promotion of private interests” in legislation grew by leaps and bounds as larger and larger fortunes were made during the heyday of the Industrial Revolution— and as the impact of general laws on corporate opportunities grew. During the Robber Baron era of the 1880s and 1890s, according to the definitive history by Matthew Josephson, “The halls of legislation were transformed into a mart where the price of votes was haggled over, and laws, made to order, were bought and sold.” It was during this corrupt era that the U.S. Supreme Court first designated corporations as “persons” entitled to some of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment in an 1886 decision (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company). The decision itself, in favor of the Southern Pacific, did not actually address the subject of corporate “personhood,” but language that some historians believe was written by Justice Stephen Field was added in the “headnotes” of the case by the court reporter, who was the former president of a railway company. The chief justice had signaled before hearing the oral arguments that “the court does not wish to hear argument on the question of whether  …   the Fourteenth Amendment  …   applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.” (This backhanded precedent for the doctrine of corporate personhood was relied upon by conservative Supreme Courts in the late twentieth century for extensions of “individual rights” to corporations— and in the Citizens United decision in 2010.) This pivotal case has an interesting connection to the first nerve endings of the worldwide communications networks that later became the Global Mind. The brother of Justice Field, Cyrus Field, laid the first transoceanic telegraph cable in 1858. A third Field brother, David (whose large campaign contributions to Abraham Lincoln had resulted in Stephen’s appointment to the Supreme Court), happened to be in Paris with his family during the Paris Commune in 1871, and used the telegraph cable to send news of the riots, disorder, and subsequent massacre back to the United States in real time. It was the first time in history that an overseas news event was followed in the United States, as it unfolded, on a daily basis. Though the Paris Commune had complex causes (including the bitter emotions surrounding the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War that month and the struggle between republicans and monarchists), it became the first symbolic clash between communism and capitalism.† Karl Marx had published Das Kapital just four years earlier and wrote The Civil War in France during the two months of the Commune, saying that it would be “forever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society.” A half century later, at Lenin’s funeral, his body was wrapped in a torn and tattered red and white flag that had been flown by Parisians during the two months of the Commune. But as much as the Paris Commune inspired communists, it terrified elites in the United States, among them Justice Field, who was obsessively following the daily reports from his brother and journalists in Paris. The Paris Commune received more press coverage— almost all of it hostile— than any other story that year besides government corruption. The fear provoked by the Commune was magnified by labor unrest in the U.S., particularly by many who had arrived since the 1830s from the poorer countries of Europe in search of a better life but had been victimized by the unregulated abuses in low-wage industrial jobs. Two years later, the U.S. was plunged into a depression by the bankruptcy of financier and railroad entrepreneur Jay Cooke. Wages fell even lower and unemployment climbed even higher. The New York Times warned, “There is a ‘dangerous class’ in New York, quite as much as in Paris, and they want only the opportunity or the incentive to spread abroad the anarchy and ruin of the French Commune.” According to historians, **Justice Field was so radicalized by the Commune** and what he feared were its implications for U.S. class warfare **that he decided** to make it **his mission to strengthen corporations**. His strategy was **to use the** new **Fourteenth Amendment**, which had been designed to confer the constitutional rights of persons on the freed slaves, **as a vehicle for extending the rights of persons to corporations instead**. **By the last decade of the nineteenth century**, **concentrated corporate power had attained such a shocking degree of control over American democracy that it triggered a populist reaction**. When the Industrial Revolution resulted in the mass migration of Americans from farms to cities, and **public concern grew over excesses and abuses such as child labor, long working hours, low wages, dangerous work environments, and unsafe food and medicines**, reformers worked within the democracy sphere to demand new government policies and protections in the marketplace. The Progressive movement at the turn of the twentieth century began implementing new laws to rein in corporate power, including the first broad antitrust law, the Sherman Act of 1898, though the Supreme Court sharply limited its constitutionality, as it limited the application and enforcement of virtually all Progressive legislation. In 1901, after the pro-corporate president William McKinley was assassinated only six months into his term, Theodore **Roosevelt** unexpectedly became president, and the following year **launched an extraordinary assault on monopolies and abuses of overbearing corporate power**. Roosevelt established the Bureau of Corporations inside his new Department of Commerce and Labor. **He launched an antitrust suit to break up** **J. P. Morgan’s** **Northern Securities** Corporation, **which included 112 corporations worth a combined $ 571 billion** (in 2012 dollars), at the beginning of the twentieth century, and was worth “twice the total assessed value of all property in thirteen states in the southern United States.” This was **followed by forty more antitrust suits**. **A seemingly inexhaustible source of presidential energy, Roosevelt also passed the Pure Food and Drug Act and protected more than 230 million acres of land, including the Grand Canyon, the Muir Woods, and the Tongass forest reserve— all while building the Panama Canal and winning the Nobel Peace Prize for resolving the Russo-Japanese War.** Roosevelt made a fateful decision at the beginning of his presidency not to run for a second full term in 1908, noting that he had served almost the full eight years that George Washington had established as the “wise custom” by serving only two terms. When Roosevelt’s handpicked successor, William Howard Taft, abandoned many of TR’s reforms, the march of corporate power resumed. In response, Roosevelt began to organize his Bull Moose Party campaign to replace Taft as president in the election of 1912. In October of 1910, Roosevelt said, “**Exactly as** the **special interests of cotton and slavery** **threatened our** **political integrity before the Civil War**, **so now** the **great special business interests** too often **control and corrupt the** men and **methods of government** **for their own profit**.” Eighteen months later, in the midst of the campaign, he said that his party was engaged in a struggle for its soul: The Republican party is now facing a great crisis. It is to decide whether it will be, as in the days of Lincoln, the party of the plain people, the party of progress, the party of social and industrial justice; or whether it will be the party of privilege and of special interests, the heir to those who were Lincoln’s most bitter opponents, the party that represents the great interests within and without Wall Street which desire through their control over the servants of the public to be kept immune from punishment when they do wrong and to be given privileges to which they are not entitled. After Roosevelt lost that campaign to Woodrow Wilson (Taft came in third), he continued to speak out forcefully in favor of Progressive reforms and a rollback of corporate power. **He said** that **the most important test of the country remained “the struggle of free (wo)men to gain and hold the right of self-government as against the special interests,** **who twist the methods of free government into machinery for defeating the popular will**.” He proposed that the U.S. “prohibit the use of corporate funds directly or indirectly for political purposes,” and in speech after speech, argued that the Constitution “does not give the right of suffrage to any corporation.” **Thanks** in part **to his vigorous advocacy, the** **Progressive movement gained strength**, passing a constitutional amendment to reverse the Supreme Court’s prohibition against an income tax, enacting an inheritance tax, and enacting numerous regulations to rein in corporate abuses. The many Progressive reforms continued during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, but the pendulum shifted back toward corporate dominance of democracy during the Warren Harding administration— remembered for its corruption, including the Teapot Dome scandal in which oil company executives secretly bribed Harding administration officials for access to oil on public lands. Following three pro-corporate Republican presidents, President Franklin Roosevelt launched the second wave of reform when he took office in 1933 in the midst of the suffering caused by the Great Depression that was triggered by the stock market crash of 1929. The New Deal expanded federal power in the marketplace to a formidable scale and scope. But once again the conservative Supreme Court stopped many of the Progressive initiatives, declaring them unconstitutional. Theodore Roosevelt had declared the justices “a menace to the welfare of the nation” and FDR essentially did the same. But he went further, proposing a court-packing plan to add to the number of justices on the court in an effort to dilute the power of the pro-business majority. Historians differ on whether Roosevelt’s threat was the cause or not, but a few months later the Supreme Court reversed course and began approving the constitutionality of most New Deal proposals. To this day, some right-wing legal advocates refer to the court’s switch as a “betrayal.” In the twenty-first century, right-wing judicial activists are trying to return court rulings to the philosophy that existed prior to the New Deal. In spite of FDR’s initiatives, the U.S. found it difficult to escape hard times, and slipped back into depression in 1938. Then, when America mobilized to respond to the totalitarian threat from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the Depression finally ended. After the U.S. emerged victorious, its remarkable economic expansion continued for more than three decades. By then, the consensus in favor of an expanded role for the federal government in addressing national problems was supported by a majority of voters across the political spectrum. In the turbulent decade of the 1960s, however, the seeds of a corporate-led counterreform movement were planted. After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the fall of 1963, a variety of social reform movements swept the nation— driven in part by the restless energy and idealism of the huge postwar baby boom generation just entering young adulthood. **The civil rights** movement, the **women’s** movement, the **first gay rights demonstrations, the consumer rights movement**, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, **and** the **escalating protests against the continuation of the ill-considered proxy war against communism in Southeast Asia** all **combined to produce a fearful reaction by corporate interests and conservative ideologues.** Just as the Paris Commune had radicalized Justice Stephen Field 100 years earlier, the **social movements in** the U.S. during **the** 19**60s** also **awakened a fear of disorder**, **radicalized** a generation of right-wing market fundamentalists, and instilled a sense of mission in **soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice** Lewis **Powell**. Powell, a Richmond lawyer then **best known for representing the tobacco industry** after the surgeon general’s 1964 linkage of cigarettes to lung cancer, **wrote a** lengthy and **historic** 1971 **memorandum** **for** the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which **he presented a comprehensive plan for a sustained and massively funded long-term effort to change the nature of the U.S. Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary in order to tilt the balance in favor of corporate interests.** Powell was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Nixon two months later— though his plan for the Chamber of Commerce was not disclosed publicly until long after his confirmation hearings. A former president of the American College of Trial Lawyers, Powell was widely respected, even by his ideological opponents. But **his aggressive expansion of corporate rights was the most consequential development during his tenure on the court**. Justice **Powell wrote decisions creating the** **novel concept of “corporate speech,”** which he found to be protected by the First Amendment. This doctrine was then **used** by the court **to invalidate** **numerous laws** that were **intended to restrain corporate power when it interfered with the public interest**. In 1978, for example, Powell wrote the opinion in a 5– 4 decision that for the first time struck down state laws prohibiting corporate money in an election (a citizens referendum in Massachusetts) on the grounds that the law violated the free speech of “corporate persons.” Thirty-two years later, **the** U.S. Supreme **Court relied on Powell’s opinion to allow** **wealthy individual donors to contribute unlimited amounts to campaigns secretly**, and further expanded the 1886 Southern Pacific precedent **declaring corporations to be persons**. While it is true that corporations are made up of individuals, the absurdity of the legal theory that corporations are “persons”— as defined in the Constitution— is evident from a comparison between the essential nature and motives of corporations compared to those of flesh-and-blood human beings. Most corporations are legally chartered by the state with an ironclad mandate to focus narrowly on the financial interests of their shareholders. They are theoretically immortal and often have access to vast wealth. Twenty-five U.S.-based multinational corporations have revenues larger than many of the world’s nation-states. More than half (53) of the 100 largest economies on Earth are now corporations. ExxonMobil, one of the largest corporations in the world, measured by revenue and profits, has a larger economic impact than the nation of Norway. **Individuals are capable of decisions that reflect factors other than their narrow financial self-interest; they are capable of feeling concern about the future their children and grandchildren will inherit— not just the money they will leave them** in their wills; America’s founders decided as individuals, for example, to pledge “our Lives, our Fortunes, and our Sacred Honor” to a cause deemed far greater than money. Corporate “persons,” on the other hand, now often seem to have little regard for how they can help the country in which they are based; they are only concerned about how that country can help them make more money. At an oil industry gathering in Washington, D.C., an executive from another company asked the then CEO of Exxon, Lee Raymond, to consider building additional refinery capacity inside the United States “for security” against possible shortages of gasoline. According to those present, Raymond replied, “I’m not a U.S. company and I don’t make decisions based on what’s good for the U.S.” Raymond’s statement recalls the warning by **Thomas Jefferson** in 1809, barely a month after leaving the White House, when he **wrote to John Jay about “the selfish spirit of commerce, which knows no country, and feels no passion or principle but that of gain.”** With the emergence of Earth Inc., multinational corporations have also acquired the ability to play nation-states off against one another, locating facilities in jurisdictions with lower wages and less onerous restrictions on their freedom to operate as they wish. The late chairman of the libertarian Cato Institute, William Niskanen, said, “corporations have become sufficiently powerful to pose a threat to governments,” adding that this is “particularly the case with respect to multinational corporations, who will have much less dependence upon the positions of particular governments, much less loyalty in that sense.” In 2001, President George W. Bush was asked by the prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, to influence ExxonMobil’s pending decision on allowing India’s state-owned oil company to participate in a joint venture including the oil company and the government of Russia. Bush replied, “Nobody tells those guys what to do.” Those who advocate expanding the market sector at the expense of democratic authority believe that governments should rarely have the power to tell corporations “what to do.” For the last forty years, pursuant to the Powell Plan, for several decades— were victims of their own success. As tens of millions were lifted into the middle class, many lost their enthusiasm for continued government interventions, in part because they began to resist the levels of taxation necessary to support a more robust government role in the economy. Labor unions, one of the few organized forces supporting continued reform, lost members as more jobs migrated from manufacturing into services, and as outsourcing and robosourcing hollowed out the U.S. middle class. The nature and sources of America’s economic strength have changed over the last several decades as manufacturing has declined. America’s branch of Earth Inc. can’t be driven solely by wages— investment is of course critical— but the tilt is important, and too little noted. Slowly at first, but then with increasing momentum, the prevailing ideology of the United States— democratic capitalism— has shifted profoundly on its axis. During the decades of conflict with communism, the internal cohesion between the democratic and capitalist spheres was particularly strong. But when communism disappeared as an ideological competitor and democratic capitalism became the ideology of choice throughout most of the world, the **internal tensions between the democratic sphere and the capitalist sphere reappeared**. As economic globalization accelerated, the imperatives of business were relentlessly pursued by multinational corporations. **With triumphalist fervor and the enormous resources made available for a sustained implementation of the Powell Plan,** **corporate and right-wing forces set about diminishing the role of government in American society and enhancing the power of corporations.** Market fundamentalists began to advocate the reallocation of decision-making power from democratic processes to market mechanisms. There were **proposals to** privatize— and **corporatize**— **schools, prisons, public hospitals, highways, bridges, airports,** water and power utilities, police, fire, and emergency services, some military operations, **and** other **basic functions that had been performed by democratically elected governments**. By contrast, virtually **any proposal that required** the **exertion of governmental authority**— **even if it was proposed, debated, designed, and decided in a free democratic process**— **was** often **described as a dangerous and despicable step toward totalitarianism**. **Advocates of policies shaped within the democratic sphere and implemented through the instruments of self-government sometimes found themselves accused of being agents of** the discredited ideology that had been triumphantly defeated during the long struggle with **communism.** The very notion that something called the public interest even existed was derided and attacked as a dangerous concept. By then, the **encroachment of big money into the democratic process** had **convinced many Democrats** as well as almost all **Republicans to adopt the** new **ideology that supported the contraction of the democratic sphere and the expansion of the market sphere**. It was during this same transition period that **television supplanted newspapers as the principal source of information for the majority of voters, and the role of money in political campaigns increased, giving corporate and other special interest donors an even more unhealthy degree of power over the deliberations of the** United States **Congress** and state legislatures. **When** the **decisions** of the United States **result** **not from democratic debate but are instead determined by powerful special interests, the results can be devastating to the interests of the American people**. **Underfunded and poorly designed** U.S. **social policies have produced** a relative **decline in the conditions of life**. **Compared to the other nineteen advanced industrial democracies** in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), **the U**nited **S**tates **has the** **highest inequality of incomes** and **the highest poverty rate**; **the lowest “material well-being of children” according** to the United Nations’ index, the highest child poverty rate **and** **the highest infant mortality rate**; **the biggest prison population and the highest homicide rate**; the biggest expenditures on health care and the largest percentage of its citizens unable to afford health care. At the same time, the **success by corporate interests in reducing regulatory oversight created new risks for the U.S. economy**. For example, **the deregulation of the financial services industry**, which accompanied the massive increase in flows of trade and investment throughout the world, **led directly to the credit crisis of 2007, which caused the Great Recession** (which some economists are now calling “the Second Great Contraction” or “the Lesser Depression”). The international consequences of that spectacular market failure dramatically undermined global confidence in U.S. leadership of economic policy and marked the end of an extraordinary period of U.S. dominance. Nations had generally accepted the so-called Washington Consensus as the best formula for putting their economies on sound footing and building the capacity for sustainable growth. Although most of the policy recommendations contained in the consensus were broadly seen as reflecting sound economic common sense, they tended to expand the market sphere in domestic economies as they removed barriers to global trade and investment flows. Two **other factors combined with the** 20**07**– 08 **economic crisis** to **undermine** the **leadership of the U**nited **S**tates: first, the rise of China’s economy, which did not follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus even though its success was driven by the uniquely Chinese form of capitalism; second, **the catastrophic invasion of Iraq**— for reasons that were later proven to be false and dishonest. Within the United States, it **is a measure of** **how distorted the “conversation of democracy” has become** **that in the aftermath of the economic catastrophe**, **the most significant “populist” reaction in the U.S. political system was not a progressive demand for protective regulations to prevent a recurrence** of what had just happened, **but** instead **a** **right-wing faux-populist demand by the Tea Party for less government regulation.** **This movement was financed and hijacked by corporate and right-wing lobbyists** who took advantage of the sense of grievance and steered it toward support of an agenda that promoted corporate interests and further diminished the ability of the government to rein in abuses. **Extreme partisanship by congressional Tea Party Republicans almost** **produced a default** **of the U.S. government in** 20**11**, and threatened to again at the end of 2012. The **sudden growth of the Tea Party was** also **due** in significant measure **to** its **promotion by Fox News**, **which** under the ownership of Rupert Murdoch and the leadership of a former media strategist for Richard Nixon— Roger Ailes— **has** **exceeded the wildest dreams** of the Powell Plan’s emphasis on **changing the nature of American television.** Powell had proposed that “The national television networks should be monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance.” He called for the creation of “opportunity for supporters of the American system” within the television medium. The **inability of American democracy to make difficult decisions is** now **threatening the nation’s economic future**— **and** with it the **ability of the world system to find a pathway forward toward a sustainable future**. The **exceptionally bitter partisan divide** in the United States is nominally between the two major political parties. However, the nature of both Democrats and Republicans **has evolved** in ways that sharpen the differences between them. On the surface, it appears that Republicans have moved to the right and purged their party of moderates and extinguished the species of liberal Republicans that used to be a significant minority within the party. Democrats, according to this surface analysis, have moved to the left and have largely pushed out moderates and the conservative Democrats who used to play a prominent role in the party. **Beneath the surface**, however, the **changes are far more complex**.

**2AC Presumed Neutrality**

**Traditional framework operate within a white epistemology**

Shaw, ’04 [Katharine, Associate Professor of Urban Studies at Ohio State Using Feminist Critical Policy Analysis in the Realm of Higher Education: The Case of Welfare Reform as Gendered Educational Policy Source: The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 75, No. 1, Special Issue: Questions of Research and Methodology, (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 56-79]

The methods and theoretical frameworks that dominate current policy analysis have been developed and implemented by those in power who, particularly in the world of policy formation and analysis, are overwhelmingly white, male, and well educated. Thus, traditional policy research has**,** according to Marshall,reflected the assumptions, worldview, and values of this group**. As is the case with much mainstream research in the social sciences,** traditional policy analysis **can be characterized by the following elements. Among the most important are a belief in a single concept of truth (**truth with a capital "T"); **the assumption that objectivity on the part of the researcher is both achievable and desirable; the assumption that all research subjects share the same relationship to their social environment,** thereby rendering such particularities as gender, race, social class, and sexuality unimportant**; and the practice of evaluating women on the basis of male norms** (Bensimon & Marshall, 1997, p. 7-8).Since this **positivist** paradigm is **so widely** accepted in the policy world, it allows policy analysts to assume a dispassionate, objective stance and at the same time encourages the broader policy community to perceive the research enterprise in this way. **Thus, traditional policy analysis willfully ignores the inherently political nature of all research, and policy research in particular. As Marshall states,** "Traditional policy analysis is grounded in a narrow, falsely objective, overly instrumental view of rationality that masks its latent biases and allows policy elites and technocrats to present analyses and plans as neutral and objective when they are actually tied to prevailing relations of power"(1997a, p. 3).

**Fairness is not neutral or objective but rather shot through with biases produced by dominant power relations**

**Delgado ‘92**

[Richard, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992. “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

**The public sphere will collapse now --- a counter narrative of bottom-up student activism against authoritarianism solves**

**Giroux 11** (Henry A, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department., Left Behind? American Youth and the Global Fight for Democracy , truth-out.org/opinion/item/68:left-behind-american-youth-and-the-global-fight-for-democracy

**Within the last few months, we have seen an outpouring of student protests from all over the globe**. **Fifty thousand** students took to the streets **in London** to protest tuition hikes, **while "thousands of young people in Puerto Rico and Ireland are marching against cuts to student funding** and fee increases."(2) Students in France and Greece are demonstrating with their bodies, confronting the police and registering their outrage over the imposition of severe austerity measures. In Spain and Italy, youth are challenging unemployment rates that have soared to 40 and 30 percent respectively. **In Tunisia and Egypt, students have been at the forefront of uprisings that eventually led to the overthrow of authoritarian societies**, which for too long forced young people to linger in a liminal space in which there were no jobs, no hope for the future and far too few freedoms. This general sense of frustration among young people is widespread in Europe and the Middle East. For instance, students marching in Rome "shouted, 'We don't want to pay for the crisis,' referring to the financial crisis that has turned ... labor market[s] from bad to worse. 'Where do I see my future? Certainly not in this country,' said protester, Morgana Proietti, expressing a common sentiment."(3)

**Counterpublic spheres** **and modes of resistance** **that we** once **did not think young people could mount** **have erupted in a** **rush of emotional and political expressions** **and** scattered **demonstrations**. Mass demonstrations have been organized through the emergent screen cultures of a generation well versed in new technologically assisted forms of social networking and political exchange. **Governments** **complicit with a** **lethal combination** **of** **massive inequality, joblessness and ongoing cutbacks in social services are** now **the object of** righteous **youthful aggression** in which buildings are occupied, pitched battles are waged in the streets and banners are dropped from national symbols like the Leaning Tower of Pisa and once impregnable governmental institutions. Shared sufferings, pent up repressions, ideological longings and emotional attachments have flared up **in a** **massive collective demand** **by young people** **to be** **part of a future** **in which** **justice, democratic values and politics once again matter**. Forging collective spaces of resistance, young people are expressing their long simmering anger and indignation against harsh injustices, growing inequalities and insufferable injuries in both totalitarian and allegedly democratic countries. The fear of political transgression that kept individual actors in check has given way to a politics in which dissent is amplified, multiplied and seized upon with vigor and moral courage that has seldom found such thunderous expression among young people since the late 1970s. Democracy is no longer being defended. It is being reinvented as a kind of shared existence that makes the political possible.(4)

Moral outrage infused by a complex of affective connections, social despair and a deeply held sense of shared possibilities has created a spontaneous tsunami of collective protests, strikes, rallies and demonstrations that have toppled governments, prompted shameless retaliatory outbursts of state terrorism and further fueled the possibilities for a global sense of resistance among repressed youth everywhere. **Young people have used the new media to mobilize mass demonstrations, pitting their bodies against the police, Army, and other repressive forces**. But **they have** also **used the Internet** and various social networks such as Twitter and Facebook **to reach across national boundaries**. In doing so, **they have shared experiences, gathered information, circulated strategies for dealing with the police and developed nonviolent modes of** protest.(5) For example, young leaders in Egypt exchanged information "with similar youth movements in Libya, Algeria and Morocco and Iran."(6)

Signaling a generational crisis that is global in scope, **young people have sent a message to the world that they refuse to live any longer under repressive political regimes sustained by morally bankrupt neoliberal world**. Throughout Europe, youth exercised their sense of collective agency **by calling for a revision of how democracy both listens to and treats them**. In doing so, they disrupted the neoliberal inclination to take flight from social and moral responsibility. They defied a social order in which they could not work at a decent job, have access to a quality education or support a family, a social order that offered them only a life stripped of self-determination and dignity. A generation that was viewed as no longer having or caring about the future decided to abandon whatever residual faith they might have had in official politics or, for those who had none, the depoliticizing cynicism that often accompanies a loss of hope in the future. In an outburst that indicted the lack of vision, courage and responsibility on the part of their elders, young people in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, France, Puerto Rico and Greece took history into their own hands. They were fighting not merely for a space to survive, but for a society in which matters of justice, dignity and freedom are objects of collective struggle. These uprisings signal a new stage in which **young people** once again are **defining** what John Pilger calls **the "theater of the possible**."(7)

The shimmering fantasy, if not illusion and banalization, of hope gave way to a politics of collective action and massive resistance. From Tunis to Paris, a politics emerged that revealed a longing for the not yet and still possible. While marked by different historical contexts and diverse problems, **this is a new kind of global politics in which the promise of democracy is reclaimed as a site of resistance rather than being used as either a hypocritical slogan for defending a repressive status quo or an empty appeasement promoting endless deferral of the promise of a better life**. Students in Western Europe, in particular, are doing more than protesting cuts in educational funding and higher tuition rates; they are also loudly rejecting the market-driven insistence that education neither qualifies as a public good, nor should it be valued as a democratic public sphere. Nina Power, one of the student protesters in London, makes this clear in a comment reported in The Guardian UK. She insisted, "It was a protest against the narrowing of horizons; a protest against Lib Dem hypocrisy; a protest against the increasingly utilitarian approach to human life that sees degrees as nothing but 'investments' by individuals and denies any link between education and the broader social good."(8) Giuliano Amato, a former Italian prime minister, in an interview with the country's largest newspaper, Corriere della Sera, makes clear that what students are protesting against involves more than economic issues. As he puts it, "they are also against a general situation in which the older generations have eaten the future of the younger ones."(9)

Underlying these youth protests in various countries are a set of conditions that reflect differing economic and political contexts. Yet, at the same time many of these nations share a disdain for young people and a not too hidden willingness to take advantage of any youth who are deemed valuable, leaving the rest to be increasingly viewed as troublemakers and subject to a growing apparatus of discipline and control. Under the global regime of a harsh, endlessly commodifying market-driven society that nonetheless parades under the banner of global democratization, many youth are confined to what anthropologist Joao Biehl provocatively calls "zones of social abandonment."(10) These expanding groups of young people, especially those marginalized by class, race and immigrant status, are defined as a liability, no longer worthy of either social investment or the promise of a decent future. **They are deprived of those autonomous social spaces in which the conditions exist for them to narrate themselves as individual and social agents**. Meanwhile, **politics under neoliberalism has been redefined through the double registers of corruption and punishment** - not behind people's backs, as Marx once supposed it, but **in full spectacular view of the world.**

Out of place and subject to a grating diversity of realities that reveal massive unemployment, underpaid temporary work, skyrocketing tuition, escalating rent, rising food costs, deepening poverty and the indignity of having to live with their parents, youth no longer symbolize one of the most crucial investments enabling a society to build on its dreams. On the contrary, placed at the limits of the social, youth have become, as Jean and John Comaroff point out, "the creatures of our nightmares, of our social impossibilities and our existential angst."(11) Moreover, any expression of dissent invites state sanctioned rage, violence, torture and imprisonment. Both banned and abandoned by society, too many young people around the globe now live in what Zygmunt Bauman calls "a state of perpetual emergency."(12)

Every generation for the last 30 years has endorsed **neoliberal policies**, **leav**ing today's **young people** not only without a voice, but also **saddled with** a set of **economic, political and social conditions** **that have rendered them** **devalued, marginalized and ultimately disposable**. Evidence of the ongoing disinvestment in youth across the globe is all too visible and has come to the forefront of student protests in a number of countries. For example, as the social value placed on higher education as a public good declines, students are increasingly valued, when valued at all, as wage earners. This is rather ironic since there are few jobs for them once they graduate. That the forces at work in capitalist countries - whether putatively democratic or overtly authoritarian - deny young people a future can be seen in a litany of disheartening figures. Elias Holtz sums it up well. He writes:

In capitalist countries worldwide, young people are sandwiched between the increasingly impossible expense of schooling and the dried-up job market. Youth unemployment rates are staggering. They are above 40 percent in Spain, 30 percent in Italy and an average of 20 percent for the European Union overall. In North Africa, unemployment of recent university graduates is almost 27 percent in Morocco and over 19 percent in Algeria. A third of all Arab youth are unemployed.... **Corporations** and employers **have** also **moved to a** more **exploitative model of temporary work contracts, unpaid internships and part-time employment.** This liquidizes the young labor force, allowing companies to hire and fire at will, without the responsibility of providing job security or benefits. Many young people are forced to live at home in rich countries - unable to afford to live independently. In poorer states, they peddle goods on the street to survive.(13)

**In** countries like **the U**nited **S**tates, driven largely by financial speculation, market values and the lure of short-term profits, **young people are relegated to the status of commodities, a source of cheap labor or simply human waste**. According to the logic of neoliberalism and what can only be described as its perversion of the social, **youth as a long-term social investment fails to register politically or ethically**. Instead, **young people exist** - if it can be called an existence - **merely as** consumers, clients or **fodder for the military and prison-industrial complex.**

As more and more young people are subject to the dictates of the punishing state, they are positioned within a culture of surveillance and cruelty marked by dead time. Futureless, they have been stuck in holding patterns that make clear that America's market-driven economy is deeply disconnected from humanity's collective relationship and responsibility to youth and the future.(14) **Young people**, for the last three decades in a variety of Western societies, **have been led to believe that their choices no longer carry any serious consequences and that a better future is no longer open to them**. As Lawrence Grossberg argues, youth have been condemned to "a new modernity in which there can be only one kind of value, market value; one kind of success, profit; one kind of existence, commodities; and one kind of social relationship, markets."(15) The global recession has intensified the war on youth, as professionals and **politicians who make up a global business class now displace democracy** with austerity **and**, in doing so, **produce a** **hidden order of politics** **in which the "demand for the people's austerity hides processes of the uneven distribution of risk and vulnerability."**(16)

What is new in these youth revolts that are rewriting the politics of the Middle East and Western Europe is a refusal on the part of young people to be written out of the future. The violence of the neoliberal state and its democratic and authoritarian articulations reveals a politics in which young people are labeled as an apathetic generation comfortable with living in a "state of stupor, in a moral coma" in order to justify denying their basic needs and forcing them to bear the brunt of a growing culture of cruelty.(17) Under these circumstances, **there has been a concerted effort on the part of authoritarian and corporate states to destroy all those democratic public spheres that enable new models of association**. **If young people are granted the** **time, resources and support** **to reclaim a future that does not imitate the present, these models will have a better chance at creating the conditions for a future that makes good on the ideals and promises of democratization**. What is remarkable about the mass revolts in Europe and the Middle East today is that young people have taken the lead in rejecting a future which, for the last 30 years or more, has been shamelessly mortgaged by both Western countries embracing a form of zombie politics and economic Darwinism and authoritarian societies in the Middle East that exhibit a deep hatred for democracy.

After living through years of a debilitating and humiliating disinvestment in the future, young people have hit the streets to reject the dismantling of services provided by the social state, the selling off of public goods, the politics of unchecked individualism, the rise of the punishing state, the collapse of long-term planning for the social good and the all encompassing and iniquitous power of corporate and authoritarian modes of sovereignty. At the heart of the emergent struggles we are witnessing all over the globe are **youth movements** that **refuse to be silent** and are more than willing **to shatter**, as Jacques Rancière puts it, **the "coordinates of the sensible** [and] bonds **that enclose** spectacles ... within **the machine** **that makes** **the 'state of things' unquestionable**."(18) **Students** and young people **are** now **fighting back**, **affirming new modes of solidarity**, forming alliances with workers and labor organizations and **embracing a vision of democracy committed to economic and political equality**. Most remarkably, this new generation of young people is able not only to think in terms that relate isolated problems to larger public considerations, but also to recognize the importance of a civic society that provides the formative culture necessary for self-governing democratic societies. Hence, the emphasis on the new media, social networks and the Internet is not merely about dodging the repression of dissent. It is, more importantly, **about creating new democratic public spheres where the values, ideas, dialogue, knowledge and social relations necessary for a democracy can take root**, if not flourish.(19) **It is about creating counterpublic spheres that "assert the public character of spaces, relations and institutions regarded as private"** or currently limited to members of the ruling classes and authoritarian elites.(20) This is a generation that is fighting back and, in doing so, **inventing new pedagogical tools to expose the official scripts of power while**, at the same time, **constructing new modes of association and struggle based on democratic ideals and values**. One 15-year-old student speaking at a London youth conference captures the spirit of what it means for his generation to challenge contemporary injustices and inequality. He states:

We were meant to be the first post-ideological generation, right? ... That never thought of anything bigger than our Facebook profiles and TV screens.... I think now that claim is quite ridiculous, now we've shown that solidarity and comradeship and all those things that used to be associated with students are as relevant now as they've ever been. We are now the generation at the heart of the fight-back.(21)

**What is promising about these** student **protests is** that, while **they** may **have begun in relation to specific issues** such as rising tuition costs or mass unemployment, **they have** both gained momentum **and** successfully **mobilized** other **constituencies** such as labor **by connecting single issues to a wider set of economic, social and political conditions**. In doing so, these new social movements have called the larger neoliberal Zeitgeist into question. **Specific issues have given rise to broader considerations.** As a result, **the totality of neoliberal and totalitarian societies have begun to fragment and weaken, offering a space for a broad alliance of individuals and groups**, **who are seeking not only political reform,** **but** also **meaningful and pervasive ideological and structural changes**.

**In the face of** the mass uprisings in **Western Europe and the Middle East**, **many commentators have** **raised questions about why** **comparable forms of widespread resistance are not taking place among American youth**. Everyone from left critics to mainstream radio commentators voice surprise and disappointment that **American youth appear unengaged by the collective action their counterparts in other countries** are participating in and promoting. Courtney Martin, a senior correspondent for The American Prospect, suggests that **American students are often privileged and view politics as something that happens elsewhere, far removed from local activism**.(22) She writes: Those who are politically active tend to set their sights on distant horizons - the poor in India, say or the oppressed in Afghanistan.... Many of us from middle- and upper-income backgrounds have been socialized to believe that it is our duty to make a difference, but undertake such efforts abroad - where the "real" poor people are. We found nonprofits aimed at schooling children all over the globe while rarely acknowledging that our friend from the high school football team can't afford the same kind of opportunities we can. Or we create Third World bicycle programs while ignoring that our lab partner has to travel two hours by bus, as he is unable to get a driver's license as an undocumented immigrant. We were born lucky, so we head to the bars - oblivious to the rising tuition prices and crushing bureaucracy inside the financial aid office.(23) The other side of the overprivileged youth argument is suggested by longtime activist Tom Hayden, who argues that many students are so saddled with financial debt and focused on what it takes to get a job that they have little time for political activism.(24) **Student activism in the U**nited **S**tates, especially since the 1980s, **has been** **narrowly issues based**, ranging from a focus on student unionization, gender equity, environmental issues and greater minority enrollment to "the establishment of ethnic studies programs in universities or health-care benefits for graduate students," thus **circumscribing in advance youth participation in larger political spheres**.(25) Simon Talley, a writer for Campus Progress, may be closer to the truth in claiming that students in the United States have less of an investment in higher education than European students because, for the last 30 years, they have been told that higher education neither serves a public good nor is an invaluable democratic public sphere.(26) These commentators along with many others all underestimate the historical and current impacts of the conservative political climate on American campuses on the culture of youth protest. This conservatism took firm hold with the election of Ronald Reagan and the emergence of both neoconservative and neoliberal disciplinary apparatuses since the 1980s. Youth have in fact been very active in the last few decades, but in many instances, for deeply conservative ends. As Susan Searls Giroux has effectively argued, a series of well-funded, right-wing campus organizations have made much use of old and new media to produce best-selling screeds as well as interactive web sites for students to report injustices in the interests of protesting the alleged left totalitarianism of the academy. She writes: Conservative think tanks provide $20 million annually to the campus Right, according to the People for the American Way, to fund campus organizations such as Students for Academic Freedom, whose credo is "You can't get a good education if they're only telling you half the story" and boasts over 150 campus chapters. Providing an online complaint form for disgruntled students to fill out, the organization's website monitors insults, slurs and claims of more serious infractions that students claim to have suffered. Similarly, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, founded by William F. Buckley, funds over 80 right-wing student publications through its Collegiate Network, which has produced such media darlings as Dinesh D'Souza and Ann Coulter. There is also the Leadership Institute, which trains, supports and does public relations for 213 conservative student groups who are provided with suggestions for inviting conservative speakers to campus, help starting conservative newspapers or training to win campus elections. Or the Young Americans for Freedom, which sponsors various campus activities such as "affirmative action bake sales" where students are charged variously according to their race or ethnicity or announcements of "whites only" scholarships.(27) Liberal students, for their part, have engaged in forms of activism that also mimic neoliberal rationalities. The increasing emphasis on consumerism, immediate gratification and the narcissistic ethic of privatization took its toll in a range of student protests developed over issues such as the right to party and "a defense of the right to consume alcohol." As Mark Edelman Boren points out in his informative book on student resistance, alcohol-related issues caused student uprisings on a number of American campuses. In one telling example, he writes "At Ohio University, several thousand students rioted in April 1998 for a second annual violent protest over the loss of an hour of drinking when clocks were officially set back at the beginning of daylight savings time; forced out of area bars, upset students hurled rocks and bottles at police, who knew to show up in full riot gear after the previous year's riot. The troops finally resorted to shooting wooden 'knee-knocker' bullets at the rioters to suppress them."(28) All of these explanations have some merit in accounting for the lack of student resistance among American students, but I'd like to shift the focus of the conversation. **Student resistance in the U**nited **S**tates **must be viewed within a** **broader political landscape** **that**, with few exceptions, **remains unexamined**. In the first instance, students in Western Europe, in particular, are faced with a series of crises that are more immediate, bold and radical in their assault on young people and the institutions that bear down heavily on their lives. In the face of the economic recession, educational budgets are being cut in take-no-prisoners extreme fashion; the social state is being radically dismantled; tuition costs have spiked exponentially; and unemployment rates for young people are far higher than in the United States (with the exception of youth in poor minority communities). European students have experienced a massive and bold assault on their lives, educational opportunities and their future. Moreover, European students live in societies where it becomes more difficult to collapse public life into largely private considerations. Students in these countries have access to a wider range of critical public spheres; **politics in** many of **these countries has not collapsed entirely into the spectacle of celebrity/commodity culture**; **left-oriented political parties still exist**; and **labor unions have more political and ideological clout than they do in the United States**. Alternative newspapers, progressive media and a profound sense of the political constitute elements of a vibrant, critical, formative culture and range of public spheres that have not erased the possibility to think critically, engage in political dissent, organize collectively and inhabit public spaces in which alternative and critical theories can be developed. Because of the diverse nature of how higher education is financed and governed in the United States, the assault on colleges and universities has been less uniform and differentially spread out among community colleges, public universities and elite colleges, thus lacking a unified and highly oppressive narrative against which to position resistance. Moreover, the campus "culture wars" narrative has served to galvanize many youth around a reactionary cultural project while distancing them from the very nature of the economic and political assault on their future. All this suggests another set of questions has to be raised. The more important questions, ones which do not reproduce the all-too-commonplace demonization of young people as apathetic, are twofold. First, the issue should not be why there have been no student protests, but why have the protests that have happened not been more widespread, linked, sustained? The student protests against the draconian right-wing policies attempting to destroy the union rights and collective bargaining power of teachers supported by Republican Gov. Scott Walker in Wisconsin is one example indicating that students are engaged and concerned. There are also smaller student protests taking place at various colleges, including Berkeley, CUNY, and on other campuses throughout the United States. But student activists appear to constitute a minority of students, with very few enrolled in professional programs. Most student activists are coming from the arts, social sciences and humanities (the conscience of the college). Second, there is the crucial issue of what sort of conditions have young people inherited in American society that has undermined their ability to be critical agents capable of waging a massive protest movement against the growing injustices they face on a daily basis? After all, the assault on higher education in the United States, while not as severe as in Europe, still suggests ample reasons for students to be in the streets protesting such policies. Close to 43 states have pledged major cuts to higher education in order to compensate for insufficient state funding. This means an unprecedented hike in tuition rates is being implemented, enrollments are being slashed, salaries are being reduced and need-based scholarships in some states are being eliminated. Pell Grants, which allow poor students to attend college, are being cut. Robert Reich has chronicled some of the impacts on university budgets, which include: Georgia cutting "state funding for higher education by $151 million"; Michigan reducing "student financial aid by $135 million";(29) Florida raising tuition in its 11 public universities by 15 percent; and the University of California increasing tuition by 40 percent in two years.(30) As striking as these increases are, tuition has steadily risen over the past several decades, becoming a disturbingly normative feature of post-secondary education. One reason students are not protesting these cuts in large numbers may be that, by the time the average American student now graduates, he or she has not only a degree, but also an average debt of about $23,000.(31) The vast majority must balance jobs with academics, leaving no opportunity to protest, however motivated a student might be. This debt amounts to a growing form of indentured servitude for many students that both undercuts any viable notion of social activism and is exacerbated by the fact that "unemployment for recent college graduates jumped from 5.8 percent to 8.7 percent in 2009." (32) Crippling debt plus few job opportunities in a society in which individuals are relentlessly held as solely responsible for the problems they experience leaves little room for rethinking the importance of larger social issues and the necessity for organized collective action against systemic injustices. In addition, as higher education becomes one of the most fundamental requirements for employment, many universities have reconfigured their mission exclusively in corporate terms, replacing education with training and defining students as consumers, faculty as a cheap form of subaltern labor and entire academic departments as "cost centers and revenue production units."(33) No longer seen as a social or public good, higher education is increasingly viewed less as a site of struggle than as a credential mill for success in the global economy. Meanwhile, not only have academic jobs been disappearing, but **given the shift to** an **instrumentalist education** **that is technicist in nature**, **students have been confronted** for quite some time **with a vanishing culture for sustained critical thinking**. As universities and colleges emphasize market-based skills, students are neither learning how to think critically nor how to connect private troubles with larger public issues. The humanities continue to be downsized, eliminating one source of learning that encourages students to develop a commitment to public values, social responsibilities and the broader demands of critical citizenship. Moreover, critical thinking has been devalued as a result of the growing corporatization of higher education. Under the influence of corporate values, thought in its most operative sense loses its modus operandi as a critical mediation on "civilization, existence and forms of evaluation."(34) Increasingly, it has become more difficult for students to recognize how their education in the broadest sense has been systematically devalued and how this not only undercuts their ability to be engaged critics, but contributes further to making American democracy dysfunctional. How else to explain the reticence of students in protesting against tuition hikes? The forms of instrumental training they receive undermine any critical capacity to connect the fees they pay to the fact that the United States puts more money into the funding of war, armed forces and military weaponry than the next 25 countries combined - money that could otherwise fund higher education.(35) The inability both to be critical of such injustices and to relate them to a broader understanding of politics, suggests a failure to think outside of the normative sensibilities of a neoliberal ideology that isolates knowledge and normalizes its own power relations. In fact, one recent study found that "45 percent of students show no significant improvement in the key measures of critical thinking, complex reasoning and writing by the end of their sophomore years."(36) The corporatization of schooling over the last few decades has done more than make universities into adjuncts of corporate power. It has also produced a culture of illiteracy and undermined the conditions necessary to enable students to be engaged and critical agents. The value of knowledge is now linked to a crude instrumentalism and the only mode of education that seems to matter is one that enthusiastically endorses learning marketable skills, embracing a survival-of-the-fittest ethic and defining the good life solely through accumulation and disposing of the latest consumer goods. Academic knowledge has been stripped of its value as a social good; to be relevant and therefore funded, knowledge has to justify itself in market terms or simply perish. Enforced privatization, the closing down of critical public spheres and the endless commodification of all aspects of social life have created a generation of students, who are increasingly being reared in a society in which politics is viewed as irrelevant, just as the struggle for democracy is erased from social memory. This is not to suggest that Americans have abandoned the notion that ideas have power or that ideologies and visions can move people. Unfortunately, the institutions and cultural apparatuses that generate such ideas seem to be primarily controlled by the corporate media, right-wing think tanks, and other conservative groups. Public pedagogy is dominated by the right, whose activities proceed, more often than not, unchallenged from a left that has never taken public pedagogy seriously as part of its political strategy. The rise of the Tea Party movement seems to have no counterpart among progressives, especially young people, though this may change given the arrogant and right-wing attack being waged on unions, public-sector workers and public school educators in Wisconsin, Florida, Ohio, New Jersey, and other states where Tea Party candidates have come to power.(37) In a social order dominated by the relentless privatizing and commodification of everyday life and the elimination of critical public spheres, young people find themselves in a society in which the formative cultures **necessary for a democracy to exist have been more or less eliminated, reduced to spectacles of consumerism made palatable through a daily diet of game shows, reality TV and celebrity culture**. **What is particularly troubling in American society is the absence of vital, formative cultures necessary to construct questioning agents, who are capable of seeing through the consumer come-ons, who can dissent and act collectively in an increasingly imperiled democracy**. Sheldon Wolin is instructive in his insistence that the creation of a democratic, formative culture is fundamental to enabling both political agency and a critical understanding of what it means to sustain a viable democracy. According to Wolin, democracy is about the conditions that make it possible for ordinary people to better their lives by becoming political beings and by making power responsive to their hopes and needs. **What is at stake in democratic politics is whether ordinary men and women can recognize that their concerns are best protected and cultivated under a regime whose actions are governed by principles of commonality, equality and fairness, a regime in which taking part in politics becomes a way of staking out and sharing in a common life and its forms of self-fulfillment**. Democracy is not about bowling together but about managing together those powers that immediately and significantly affect the lives and circumstances of others and one's self.(38) **Instead of public spheres that promote dialogue, debate and arguments with supporting evidence, American society offers young people a conservatizing, deformative culture through entertainment spheres that infantilize almost everything they touch, while legitimating opinions that utterly disregard evidence, reason, truth and civility**. The delete button has replaced the critical knowledge and the modes of education needed for intimacy, long-term commitments and the search for the good society. Attachments are short-lived and the pleasure of instant gratification cancels out the coupling of freedom, reason and responsibility. As a long-term social investment, young people are now viewed as a liability, if not a pathology. No longer a symbol of hope and the future, they are viewed as a drain on the economy and if they do not assume the role of functioning consumers, they are considered disposable. Within the last 30 years, the United States under the reign of market fundamentalism has been transformed into a society that is more about forgetting than learning, more about consuming than producing, more about asserting private interests than democratic rights. In a society obsessed with customer satisfaction and the rapid disposability of both consumer goods and long-term attachments, American youth are not encouraged to participate in politics. Nor are they offered the help, guidance and modes of education that cultivate the capacities for critical thinking and engaged citizenship. As Bauman points out, in a consumerist society, "the tyranny of the moment makes it difficult to live in the present, never mind understand society within a range of larger totalities."(39) Under such circumstances, according to Theodor Adorno, **thinking loses its ability to point beyond itself and is reduced to mimicking existing certainties and modes of common sense**. Under such circumstances, **thought cannot sustain itself and becomes short-lived, fickle and ephemeral.** If young people do not display a strong commitment to democratic politics and collective struggle, it is because they have lived through 30 years of "a debilitating and humiliating disinvestment in their future," especially if they are marginalized by class, ethnicity and race.(40) What is new about this generation of young people is that they have experienced first-hand the relentless spread of a neoliberal pedagogical apparatus with its celebration of an unbridled individualism and its near pathological disdain for community, public values and the public good. They have been inundated by a market-driven value system that encourages a culture of competitiveness and produces a theater of cruelty that has resulted in "a weakening of democratic pressures, a growing inability to act politically, [and] a massive exit from politics and from responsible citizenship."(41) If American students are not protesting in large numbers the ongoing intense attack on higher education and the welfare state, it may be because they have been born into a society that is tantamount to what Alex Honneth has called "an abyss of failed sociality [one in which] their perceived suffering has still not found resonance in the public space of articulation."(42) Of course, **there are students in the U**nited **S**tates **who are** involved in **protesting** the **great injustices** they see around them, including the **wars in Afghanistan and Iraq**, the **corruption of American politics by casino capitalism**, **a** **permanent war economy** **and the** **growing disinvestment in public and higher education**. But they are indeed a minority and not because they are part of what is often called a "failed generation." On the contrary, the failure lies elsewhere and points to the psychological and social consequences of growing up under a neoliberal regime that goes to great lengths to privatize hope, derail public values and undercut political commitments. The way society conceptualizes youth, especially poor youth of color, has changed from viewing youth as a symbol of hope and promise into a sign of trouble and threat. What is clear as a result of this "failed sociality" is that, **if democracy is going to deliver on its promises. not only do young people need to have a passion for public values, social responsibility and participation in society, but they also need access to those public spaces that guarantee the rights of free speech, dissent, a quality education and critical dialogue.** **At the heart of such** **public spaces** **is a** **formative culture that creates citizens who are critical thinkers capable of "putting existing institutions into question so that democracy again becomes society's movement** ... that is to say, a new type of regime in the full sense of the term."(43) **Young people need to be educated both as a condition of autonomy and for the sustainability of democratization as an ongoing movement**. **Not only does a substantive democracy demand citizens capable of self- and social criticism**, but **it** also, once again, **requires a critical formative culture in which people are provided with the knowledge and skills to be able to participate in such a society**. What we see in the struggle for educational reforms in Europe and the Middle East is a larger struggle for the economic, political and social conditions that give meaning and substance to what it means to make democracy possible. When we see 15 year olds battle the established oppressive orders in the streets of Paris, Cairo, London and Athens for a more just society, they offer a glimpse of what it means for youth to enter "modernist narratives as trouble."(44) But trouble here exceeds dominant society's eagerness to view them as a pathology, as monsters and a drain on the market-driven order. Instead, trouble speaks to something more suggestive of a "productive unsettling of dominant epistemic regimes under the heat of desire, frustration or anger."(45) The expectations that frame market-driven societies are losing their grip on young people, who can no longer be completely seduced or controlled by the tawdry promises and failed returns of corporate dominated and authoritarian regimes.

**Passivity**

**Their framework causes passivity**

**Antonio 95** (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, **the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so**. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," **Nietzsche** said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He **considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement**. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals) **in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions** and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue** about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."** Nietzsche asked, **"Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented?** . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; **social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"** (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). **Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence**; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). **Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape**. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. **''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture**. . . . **Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others**."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, **these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming**, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " **Social selves are fodder for the** "great ~~man~~ [person] of the **masses**." Nietzsche held that "**the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely**- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. **The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

**That reifies Orientalism --- absence interrogation of intellectual positionality it will persist**

**Chow, 1993 (Rey, Comparative Literature—Brown University, Writing Diaspora, p. 2-4)**

For readers who know something about China, Owen's attitude is not a particularly novel one. It is typical of the disdain found in many relatively recent American scholarly reactions toward the liberalized China of the 1980s. Harry Harding has written informatively about this kind of "debilitating contempt" that succeeded the euphoric China fever of the 1960s and 1970s.4 But more is at stake here. What kind of cultural politics is in play when a professor from Harvard University accuses the men and women from the "third world" of selling out to the West? While he criticizes poets like Bei Dao for succumbing to the commodifying tendencies of transnational culture out of "self-interest," what is absent from Owen's musings is an account of the institutional investments that shape his own enunciation. This absence constitutes a definite form of power by not drawing attention to itself and thus not subjecting itself to the harsh judgment of "self-interest" that is so useful in criticizing introduction others. The elaboration and fortification of this kind of absence amounts to the perpetuation of a deeply ingrained Orientalism in the field of East Asian studies, of which Owen's practice is but one example. Because this is an Orientalism at which many East Asia scholars, both native and non-native, connive, it is of some urgency to mobilize criticism of it. Colin MacKerras writes about Edward Said's Orientalism: "Although it was designed specifically as a critique of the Western study of West Asian civilizations, its main points are equally applicable to the study of China."5 Precisely because of this, the arguments against Said's work in the East Asian field are often similar to their counterparts in South Asian and West Asian studies. Critics like Said, it is often said, belittle and ignore the work that is being done by specialists of these non-Western cultures and that has produced knowledge about peoples whose traditions would otherwise perish. I have indicated elsewhere that we need to acknowledge the significance of this type of work as sharing an episteme with primatology. It is, however, not enough simply to align a field like East Asian studies with primatology and compare the salvational motives of their respective practitioners. What needs to be foregrounded is the nature and extent of the self-interestedness involved in the disapproval of the critique of Orientalism as a transcultural phenomenon. Although Owen in his piece is not directly criticizing Said's work, his arguments clarify many of the current feelings in his field. Basic to Owen’s disdain toward the new "world poetry" is a sense of loss and consequently, an anxiety over his own intellectual position. This annxiety can be understood in part through Sigmund Freud's analysis of melancholia.7 For Freud, we remember, the melancholic is a person who cannot get over the loss of a precious, loved object and who ultimately introjects this loss into his ego. What Freud emphasizes throughout his discussion as the unique feature of the melancholic, who differs from other kinds of mourners, is that he exhibits the symptoms of a delusional belittling of himself. Because the nature of the loss remains unconscious to the patient, the loss is directed inward, so that he becomes convinced of his own worth-lessness as if he has been unjustly abandoned. In his essay, Freud is concerned with the relationship between the self and the lost loved object. Freud's construction involves two parties, subject and object, and does not go on to show how the melancholic acts in regard to other subjects. Postcoloniality here offers a use of Freud that necessitates a rethinking of his theory about the melancholic disorder. In the case of the sinologist's relationship with his beloved object, "China," melancholia is complicated by the presence of a third party‚—the living members of the Chinese culture, who provide the sinologist with a means of externalizing his loss and directing his blame. What Freud sees as "self-directed denigration now finds a concrete realization in the denigration of others.

**Conservatism**

**Conservatism DA- their attemps to claim an a priori space for framework enevitable always reproduces the desires of the established elite at the expense of the oppressed.**

**Meszaros 89** (Istvan, likes Marx not Adam Smith. The Power of Ideology, p 232-234)

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed *Wertfreiheit* or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, **we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complications** and securing the desired objectivity **and uncontestable outcome.**

Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For **they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues**, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of *possibility* – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plans of methodology itself. **The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character**.

**In reality**, of course, **this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance**. **Since**, however, **the plane of methodology** (and ‘meta-theory’) **is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed.** Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’.

Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are *a priori* excluded from their rational discourse ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. **The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse**. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them.

This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – **far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry** – **the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent**, in fact, **to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter.** Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing *methodology for the sake of methodology:* a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point the new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for tits own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose.

Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interests and pursuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, **notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’**. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or **by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality**. For **such treatment** of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennese version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ in the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – **inevitably always favours the established order**. And it does so **by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘of of bounds’ to the potential contestants**, in the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology.

However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it out to be fairly obvious that **to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of the order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations** (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) **of that order.** Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing sort of methodological miracle.

Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational community, **the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms**. This would imply **the articulation of the relevant problems** not on the plane of self-referential articulation of the relevant problems not on the plane of self-referential theory and methodology, but **as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes**. In other words, **it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological** **and meta-theoretical** **neutrality**. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc. The conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of the *ruling ideology.*

What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are *mediated* by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And **who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models and ‘paradigms’?**

**Once**, though, **such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to considered the legitimate subject of debate**, **everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions upon the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constitution**. This why **the** **allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies** which so **successfully conceal** **and exercise** **their** apologetic **function in the guise of neutral methodology** are doubly mystifying.

Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that lend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at times completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical relationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

**2AC**

**Root cause logic is infinitely regressive and dooms change**

**Martin ‘90**, Brian, Professor of Science, Technology and Society at the University of Wollongong, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them

**Our ethic solves the root of capitalism not the other way around**

**Burke 2** Anthony Burke, Professor at University of Adelaide, Author of In Fear of Security. “The Perverse Perseverance of Sovereignty.” November 1, 2002. <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no2_2002/burke_perverse.html>.

Just as Neoliberal states collude in the construction of Empire, they continue to insist on the ontological primacy of the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a 'monopoly' which variously imprisons and expels refugees, incarcerates African-Americans, dispossesses indigenous people and runs 'counterinsurgency' operations against that most sinister threat to the nation - the movement for secession. A malign contemporary force to Hobbes' founding conditions for the survival of the State: 'Concord, Health; Sedition, Sickness; and Civill war, Death'. (Hobbes 1985: 81; see also Campbell 1998, Campbell and Shapiro 1999) 55. In such a context, Security ironically rests on the necessity of the insecurity and suffering of the Other. Warfare, killing and conflict are often driven less by the imperatives of Capital (present though they often are) than by the logic of an ontology which **refuses to coexist with otherness** and seeks an absolute solution to the threat of its existence. This is as true of the Howard Government's "deterrence" of asylum seekers through detention and military expulsion, as it is of the more openly violent strategy of the Israeli state when faced with Palestinian opposition and terrorism. 56. Such images of security weld together ontological necessity, positivist epistemology, 'realist' morality and an instrumental image of technology in the hope of realising the modern dream of the absolute 'correlation between knowledge and being'. (Levinas in Hand 1991: 76-78) This time has not passed, it is not in twilight; it enables and coexists with Empire, thwarts its temporal pull, and generates its own political urgency that is both a part of and additional to the necessary work against capital's global sovereignty. War of Sovereignty: Israel and Palestine 57. A final example - modern Israel - which is testament to the non-passage of sovereignty. In particular, the drawn out death-struggle between Israel and Palestine has been marked by the perseverance of sovereignty's ontology in the fusion of violence, religious and territorial identity, and the national security state. Since the election of the hard-line Ariel Sharon (shadowed by the even harder-line Likud pretender Benjamin Netanyahu) the conflict's worst features have been reignited, with suicide bombings, assassinations, and ferocious Israeli Defence Force (IDF) operations aimed at disabling the Palestinian authority itself. These culminated in April 2002 with "Operation Defensive Shield", the invasion of Palestinian sovereign areas by the IDF which saw the shelling of towns and refugee camps, mass arrests, torture, summary executions of Palestinian 'militants', shootings and the destruction of houses. In Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah this caused hundreds of deaths, with little impact on the ability of suicide bombers to shatter innocent Israeli lives. (Goldenberg 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Beaumont 2002a, 2002b; Sayigh 2001) 58. The needs of imperial capital have little purchase in this conflict, bar a remote and confused link with US geo-strategy. This is a struggle over identity, sovereignty and territory: one carried out not only between Arab and Jew but between Jews themselves, between conflicting images of Zionism and Israeli identity.

**Perm do both, the K alone fractures essential coalitions to solve anti racist struggles**

WEST Honorary chair of the Democratic Socialist of America 1988

Cornell-prof @Princeton University, DSA National Politicall Committee and a member of its African American Commission; “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism”; RACE & ETHNICITY ESERV; <http://race.eserver.org/toward-a-theory-of-racism.html> (year of publication found on Dr. West’s website: <http://www.pragmatism.org/library/west/>)

Socialism and Antiracism: Two Inseparable Yet Not Identical Goals It should be apparent that racist practices directed against black, brown, yellow, and red people are an integral element of U. S. history, including present day American culture and society. This means not simply that Americans have inherited racist attitudes and prejudices, but, more importantly, that institutional forms of racism are embedded in American society in both visible and invisible ways. These institutional forms exist not only in remnants of de jure job, housing, and educational discrimination and political gerrymandering. They also manifest themselves in a de facto labor market segmentation, produced by the exclusion of large numbers of peoples of color from the socioeconomic mainstream. (This exclusion results from limited educational opportunities, devastated families, a disproportionate presence in the prison population, and widespread police brutality. ) It also should be evident that past Marxist conceptions of racism have often prevented U. S. socialist movements from engaging in antiracist activity in a serious and consistent manner. In addition, black suspicion of white-dominated political movements (no matter how progressive) as well as the distance between these movements and the daily experiences of peoples of color have made it even more difficult to fight racism effectively. Furthermore, the disproportionate white middle-class composition of contemporary democratic socialist organizations creates cultural barriers to the participation by peoples of color. Yet this very participation is a vital precondition for greater white sensitivity to antiracist struggle and to white acknowledgment of just how crucial antiracist struggle is to the U. S. socialist movement. Progressive organizations often find themselves going around in a vicious circle. Even when they have a great interest in antiracist struggle, they are unable to attract a critical mass of people of color because of their current predominately white racial and cultural composition. These organizations are then stereotyped as lily white, and significant numbers of people of color refuse to join. The only effective way the contemporary democratic socialist movement can break out of this circle (and it is possible because the bulk of democratic socialists are among the least racist of Americans) is to be sensitized to the critical importance of antiracist struggles. This conscientization cannot take place either by reinforcing agonized white consciences by means of guilt, nor by presenting another grand theoretical analysis with no practical implications. The former breeds psychological paralysis among white progressives, which is unproductive for all of us; the latter yields important discussions but often at the expense of concrete political engagement. Rather what is needed is more widespread participation by predominantly white democratic socialist organizations in antiracist struggles--whether those struggles be for the political, economic, and cultural empowerment of Latinos, blacks, Asians, and Native Americans or antiimperialist struggles against U.S. support for oppressive regimes in South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, and the occupied West Bank. A major focus on antiracist coalition work will not only lead democratic socialists to act upon their belief in genuine individuality and radical democracy for people around the world; it also will put socialists in daily contact with peoples of color in common struggle. Bonds of trust can be created only within concrete contexts of struggle. This interracial interaction guarantees neither love nor friendship. Yet it can yield more understanding and the realization of two overlapping goals-- democratic socialism and antiracism. While engaging in antiracist struggles, democratic socialists can also enter into a dialogue on the power relationships and misconceptions that often emerge in multiracial movements for social justice in a racist society. Honest and trusting coalition work can help socialists unlearn Eurocentrism in a self-critical manner and can also demystify the motivations of white progressives in the movement for social justice. We must frankly acknowledge that a democratic socialist society will not necessarily eradicate racism. Yet a democratic socialist society is the best hope for alleviating and minimizing racism, particularly institutional forms of racism. This conclusion depends on a candid evaluation that guards against utopian self-deception. But it also acknowledges the deep moral commitment on the part of democratic socialists of all races to the dignity of all individuals and peoples--a commitment that impels us to fight for a more libertarian and egalitarian society. Therefore concrete antiracist struggle is both an ethical imperative and political necessity for democratic socialists. It is even more urgent as once again racist policies and Third World intervention become more acceptable to many Americans. A more effective democratic socialist movement engaged in antiracist and antiimperialist struggle can help turn the tide. It depends on how well we

**They said “disables change”**

**Their ableist scholarship necessitates eradication of those who are not mobile.**

**Imrie** prof geography @ U london **2k** (Rob, “Disability and discourses of mobility and movement” Environment and Planning A 2000, volume 32, pages 1641-1656)

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; **that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored**. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments. The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994). Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 604) argue, ``the information that animates the world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of carnality which excludes as it constructs''. These send out specific signals or codes which favour the corporeal status of nonimpaired people, or at least do little to facilitate the independent ease of movement of people with physical and mental impairments.(5) This, for Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 606), is indicative of ``a subtle interplay of micro and macro relations of power'', where specific design features, for example, prioritise forms of movement based on the bodily needs of the neutered body (which is devoid of physical and mental impairments). In this sense, intercorporeal encounters between the hegemonic world of the mobile body and disabled people tend to reinforce the former's sense of presence and the latter's sense of absence, in other words a recognition of disabled people being there but being unable to interact with the social or physical structures which surround them. It is, in Leder's (1990) terms, a projection of the absent body or bodies which ``dys-appear'' when confronted with the embodied norms of everyday life [see Paterson and Hughes (1999) for an amplification of these points].

**The alternative is to reject their ableist scholarship—using academia is uniquely key**

Michael **Bérubé 5** (literature, Penn State, PhD from UVA, “College Makeover”, http://www.slate.com/id/2130329/)

But I can dream, and when I do**, I dream that American colleges and universities will acquaint students not only with the richest literary and philosophical works in the Western tradition but also with the history of the ways in which we humans have thought about and dealt with the fact of disability.**

Disability? you wonder. **It's not enough that the pomos and multicultis have insisted on race and gender and sexuality and what-have-you? Now students have to think about marginal subjects like disability**?

**Well, yes, it would be nice—if only to prevent people from thinking about disability as a marginal subject**. From genomics to prenatal testing to special education to employment discrimination to mental illness to advance directives to Alzheimer's, **disability is integral to how humans define the parameters of the human. It's central to every idea of autonomous personhood and every conception of citizenship.**

It wouldn't take all that much to get students to see why disability matters; **once you see why it matters, you begin to see how ubiquitous it is**, and you don't need constant reminders. A course that included Henri-Jacques Stiker's A History of Disability, Alasdair Macintyre's Dependent Rational Animals, and Eva Kittay's Love's Labor would make a powerful case for the centrality of disability in Western thought, and a syllabus that included Paul Longmore and Lauri Umansky's The New Disability History: American Perspectives would demonstrate that disability is as critical to ideas of American identity as are race and immigration (and the history of race and immigration in the United States has everything to do with theories about the cognitive abilities and disabilities of the peoples of the world).

As it happens, **your average campus contains hundreds of scholars and students circling the elephant—in colleges of law, education, arts and humanities, medicine—none of whom call the elephant by name. And I think it's no accident that so few people in public life understand disability issues or disability politics—unless they happen to know someone with a disability, someone whose life makes disability visible as disability**.

**If we can remedy that—if we can acquaint college students with varieties of human mindedness and human embodiment so that they develop the capacity to think about disability not as an affliction blighting individual bodies but as a phenomenon that colors our conceptions of freedom, justice, and the good life—then we'll have made all that** tedious gen-ed committee **work worthwhile**. And we'll have done our students—and our fellow citizens, able-bodied and disabled, a positive service.

**the alt creates a police state**

**Grossberg 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 396)

Above all, rethinking the possibility of a Left politics will require a new model of intellectual and political authority which does not begin by confidently judging every investment, every practice**,** every articulation and every individual. It will have to measure both intel­lectual and political progress by movement within the fragile and contradictory realities of people's lives, desires, fears and commit­ments, and not by some idealized utopia nor by its own theoretical criteria. It will offer a moral and progressive politics which refuses to "police" everyday life and to define a structure of "proper" and appropriate behaviors and attitudes. An impure politics—certainly, without the myth of a perfect reflexivity which can guarantee its authority (for authority is not an intellectual prize).A contaminated politics, never innocent, rooted in the organization of distance and densities through which all of us move together and apart, sometimes hesitatingly, at other times recklessly. A politicsthat attempts to move people**,** perhaps just a little at first,in a different direction**.** But a politics nonetheless, one which speaks with a certain authority, as limited and frail as the lives of those who speak it. It will have to be a politics articulated by and for people who are inevitably impli­cated in the contemporary crisis of authority and whose lives have been shaped by it. A politics for and by people who live in the contemporary world of popular tastes, and who are caught in the disciplined mobilization of everyday life**.** A politics for people who are never innocent and whose hopes are always partly defined by the very powers and inequalities they oppose. A modest politics that struggles to effect real change, that enters into the often boring challenges of strategy and compromise. An impure politics fighting for high stakes.

**And flips their offense**

**Lobel 7** – Professor of Law, San Diego (Orly, The Paradox Of Extralegal Activism, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/120/feb07/lobel.pdf)

In the following sections, I argue that the extralegal model has suffered from the same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation. I show that **as an effort to avoid** the risk of legal **cooptation**, the current wave of suggested **alternatives** has effects that **ironically mirror those of cooptation itself**. Three central types of difficulties exist with con- temporary extralegal scholarship. First, in the contexts of the labor and civil rights movements, arguments about legal cooptation often developed in response to a perceived gap between the conceptual ideal toward which a social reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments. But, ironically, the contemporary message of opting out of traditional legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem. As the rise of informalization (moving to nonlegal strategies), civil society (moving to extralegal spheres), and pluralism (the proliferation of norm-generating actors) has been effected and appropriated by supporters from a wide range of political commitments, these concepts have had unintended implications that conflict with the very social reform ideals from which they stem. Second, the idea of opting out of the legal arena becomes self-defeating as it discounts the ongoing importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform in seemingly unregulated spheres. A model encompassing exit and rigid sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of increasing interpenetration and the blurring of boundaries between private and public spheres, profit and nonprofit sectors, and formal and informal institutions. It therefore loses the critical insight that law operates in the background of seemingly unregulated relationships. Again paradoxically, the extralegal view of decentralized activism and the division of society into different spheres in fact have worked to **subvert** rather than support **the progressive agenda**. Finally, since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating their success. If the critique of legal cooptation has involved the argument that legal reform, even when viewed as a victory, is never radically transformative, we must ask: what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of the suggested alternatives? As I illustrate in the following sections, much of the current scholarship obscures the lines between the descriptive and the prescriptive in its formulation of social activism. If current suggestions present themselves as alternatives to formal legal struggles, we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed and celebrated are capable of producing a constructive theory and meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics.

**A focus on racial politics is key – united class struggle fails to address segregated groups within the working class**

Ross 2000 [Marlon B., Professor, Department of English and Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies, “Commentary: Pleasuring Identity, or the Delicious Politics of Belonging,” *New Literary History*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pages 841-842]

Ironically, Ken's conclusion is full of the very identity concepts that he hopes to transcend by an appeal to a broadly conceived "political left." As I have already suggested, "the left" is an identity formation no less than race or gender or sexuality. Consider the other key terms of Ken's manifesto: "working and unemployed," "men and women," "given interests." As Professor Michaels indicates, "interests" are always implicated in identity because they concern the negotiation of subject positions. Ken's recourse to "men and women," instead of simply "people" or some other less gendered term, indicates to what extent what he's referring to is an alliance or coalition. Rather than ushering in a post-identity world of pure common interests, Ken's manifesto looks back to the prehistory of "identity politics," that Edenic moment before we fell into proliferating identities on the left. What is it that we bring together in coalitions if not "men" and "women," with the identifiable interests that generally bring them to a common place across their differing identity circumstances? What are the "working" and "unemployed" if not class-based identity formations? Most people on the left would have no difficulty supporting the general idea in Ken's manifesto. The difficulties arise once we try to move from the manifesto to politics, from the ideal to specific strategies and tactics for bringing people into a common "left." What specific agendas should we support? Do we abandon affirmative action, or fight for it? Do we dismiss abortion rights, because that does not directly concern "economic justice," or fight for it? Do we support welfare reform or fight against it? Do we ignore racial profiling, which again may seem distant from the gravity of "economic justice," or fight it? How do we determine which agendas advance "economic justice" and which ones obstruct it? Do we take a vote? Do we count who's against, who's for? Do we lobby those in our own neighbor hoods, which are by and large still segregated by race and class? Such nuts-and-bolts questions are the nuts and bolts of politics, and they are exactly the kinds of issues that "identity politics" handles effectively. Those of us who live in upscale college communities that are relatively racially integrated can sometimes forget, I think, that we are racial identity exceptions: any attempt to arrange a common interest in class across race will crash head-on (that face metonym again) into the walls of racially segregated groups within the working classes, and the diverse cultures that they self-consciously espouse. Despite the clarity and coherence of their reasonableness, or perhaps even because of the intensity of these, I find myself inventing mental images (from imagination in Professor Michaels's case and from memory in Ken's) to read between the rational reasons of their argument. Palumbo-Liu nicely captures this problematic when he writes, "Recourse to constructs like a 'reasonable person' or 'the common man' are last ditch efforts to name an ideal type toward which we must all aspire, without interrogating the assumptions that undergird that construction." It's not that I distrust reasonable men like Professor Michaels and Ken as persons (this would be presumptuous on my part), but instead that I seek to know what peculiar circumstances would lead each man (how different they are I can only guess) to such a fervid trust in rationality as a basis for political theory and practice, especially given that rationality itself, in the particular historical influence of European Enlightenment thinking, was so instrumental in forging and justifying those highly irrational identity classifications whose eyes Professor Michaels and Ken, as well as the rest of us, seek to escape. This is a well-trod history—involving thinkers as various as Linnaeus, Buffon, Gobineau, Hume, Jefferson, and Hegel (men whose last names or even titles of nobility can conjure whole continents of racial know-how)—and a familiar history which I need not rehearse here. Suffice it to say that the emergence of modern rationalism itself is difficult to disentangle from the emergence of modern identity disciplines, each forged by the other like two faces of an old coin.

**Case turns alt – racism predated and set the foundation for capitalism, a focus on capitalism alone obscures these institutional roots**

**WEST** Honorary chair of the Democratic Socialist of America **1988**

Cornell-prof @Princeton University, DSA National Politicall Committee and a member of its African American Commission; “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism”; RACE & ETHNICITY ESERV; <http://race.eserver.org/toward-a-theory-of-racism.html>

(year of publication found on Dr. West’s website: <http://www.pragmatism.org/library/west/>)

This brief examination of past Marxist views leads to one conclusion. Marxist theory is indispensable yet ultimately inadequate for grasping the complexity of racism as a historical phenomenon. Marxism is indispensable because it highlights the relation of racist practices to the capitalist mode of production andrecognizes the crucial role racism plays within the capitalist economy. Yet Marxism is inadequate because it fails to probe other spheres of American society where racism plays an integral role--especially the psychological and cultural spheres. Furthermore, Marxist views tend to assume that racism has its roots in the rise of modern capitalism. Yet, it can easily be shown that although racist practices were shaped and appropriated by modern capitalism, racism itself predates capitalism. Its roots lie in the earlier encounters between the civilizations of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America--encounters that occurred long before the rise of modern capitalism. It indeed is true that the very category of "race"--denoting primarily skin color--was first employed as a means of classifying human bodies by Francois Bernier, a French physician, in 1684. The first authoritative racial division of humankind is found in the influential Natural System (1735) of the preeminent naturalist of the 18th century, Caroluc Linnaeus. Both of these instances reveal European racist practices at the level of intellectual codificaton since both degrade and devalue non-Europeans. Racist folktales, mythologies, legends, and stories that function in the everyday life of common people predate the 17th and 18th centuries. For example, Christian anti-Semitism and Euro-Christian antiblackism were rampant throughout the Middle Ages. These false divisions of humankind were carried over to colonized Latin America where anti-Indian racism became a fundamental pillar of colonial society and influenced later mestizo national development. Thus racism is as much a product of the interaction of cultural ways of life as it is of modern capitalism. A more adequate conception of racism should reflect this twofold context of cultural and economic realities in which racism has flourished. A new analysis of racism builds on the best of Marxist theory (particularly Antonio Gramsci's focus on the cultural and ideological spheres), and yet it goes beyond by incorporating three key assumptions:

**United class struggle must occur through a racial framework**

**Meyer 2k2**

[Meyer, Weinberg. Professor Emeritus in the W.E.B. Du Bois Department of Afro-American Studies, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. *A Short History of American Capitalism.* Chapter 12: Conclusion. 2002. <http://www.allshookdown.com/newhistory/CH12.htm>] Ana

Racism has stabilized capitalism in the United States in two ways. First, it provided individual capitalist businesses with short-run solutions to worker movements for unionization. Second, it stimulated white workers to imagine that they shared class interests with white employers. In neither case did employer stratagems include the granting of genuine equality of bargaining with white workers. The purpose of racist artifice was not to award concessions to fellow whites but to create or perpetuate disunity among workers of different racial or ethnic groups. Employers

**Permutation do the plan then the alternative – double bind, either the permutation solve or the alt is not strong enough to overcome institutional roots in the status quo**

**Alternative cannot solve the case harms**

**Woodson 1933** (Carter Woodson, founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, African American historian and educator; founder and editor of the Journal of Negro History and the Negro History Bulletin; THE MISEDUCATION OF THE NEGRO; p.43-44)

The impatient, “highly educated” Negroes, therefore, say that since under the present system of capitalism the Negro has no chance to toil upward in the economic sphere, the only toil upward in the economic sphere, the only hope for bettering his condition in this respect is through socialism, the overthrow of the present economic regime, and the inauguration of popular control of resources and agencies which are now being operated for personal gain. This thought is gaining ground among Negroes in this country, and it is rapidly sweeping them into the ranks of what are commonly known as “Communists.” There can be no objection to this radical change, if it brings with it some unselfish genius to do the task better than it is now being done under the present regime of competition. Russia so far has failed to do well this particular thing under a proletarian dictatorship in an agricultural country. But whether this millennium comes or not, the capitalistic system is so strongly intrenched at present that the radicals must struggle many years to overthrow it; and if the Negro has to wait until that time to try to improve his condition he will be starved out so soon that he will not be here to tell the story. The Negro, therefore, like all other oppressed people, must learn to do the so-called “impossible.” The “uneducated” Negro business man, however, is actually at work doing the very thing which the “mis-educated” Negro has been taught to believe cannot be done. This much-handicapped Negro business man could do better if he had some assistance, but our schools are turning out men who do as much to impede the progress of the Negro in business as they do to help him. The trouble is that they do not think for themselves. If the “highly educated” Negro would forget most of the untried theories taught him in school, if he could see through the propaganda which has been instilled into his mind under the pretext of education, if he would fall in love with his own people and begin to sacrifice for their uplift- if the “highly educated” Negro would do these things, he could solve some of the problems now confronting the race.

**Class analysis that attempts to eschew identity is just an excuse for white middle class males to try and slip identity through the back door of anti capitalist movements**

**Ross 2000** [Marlon B., Professor, Department of English and Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies, “Commentary: Pleasuring Identity, or the Delicious Politics of Belonging,” *New Literary History*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pages 840-841]

Although in his contribution Eric Lott targets Professor Michaels's comments and his own recent feud with Timothy Brennan (who unfortunately is not included in this volume) rather than Ken's argument, what Eric says about “left and liberal fundamentalists” who “simply and somewhat penitently” urge us to “‘go back to class’” could also be directed at Ken's conclusion. Ken writes, “Crafting a political left that does not merely reflect existing racial divisions starts with the relatively mundane proposition that it is possible to make a persuasive appeal to the given interests of working and unemployed women and men, regardless of race, in support of a program for economic justice.” On this one, I side with Eric, rather than Tim and Ken. Standing on the left depends on whose left side we're talking about. My left might be your right and vice versa, because it depends on what direction we're facing, and what direction depends on which identities we're assuming and affirming. Eric adds, "Even in less dismissive [than Tim's] accounts of new social movements based not on class but on identities formed by histories of injustice, there is a striking a priori sense of voluntarism about the investment in this cause or that movement or the other issue—as though determining the most fundamental issue were a matter of the writer's strength of feeling rather than a studied or analytical sense of the ever-unstable balance of forces in a hegemonic bloc at a given moment." I agree, but I'll risk mangling what Eric says by putting it more crassly. Touting class or "economic justice" as the fundamental stance for left identity is just another way of telling everybody else to shut up so I can be heard above the fray. Because of the force of "identity politics," a leftist white person would be leery of claiming to lead Blacks toward the promised land, a leftist straight man leery of claiming to lead women or queers, but, for a number of complex rationalizations, we in the middle class (where all of us writing here currently reside) still have few qualms about volunteering to lead, at least theoretically, the working class toward "economic justice." What Eric calls here "left fundamentalism," I'd call, at the risk of sounding harsh, left paternalism. Of the big identity groups articulated through "identity politics," economic class remains the only identity where a straight white middle-class man can still feel comfortable claiming himself a leading political voice, and thus he may sometimes overcompensate by screaming that this is the only identity that really matters—which is the same as claiming that class is beyond identity. Partly this is because Marxist theory and Marx himself (a bourgeois intellectual creating the theoretical practice for the workers' revolution) stage the model for working-class identity as a sort of trans-identification, a magical identity that is transferable to those outside the group who commit themselves to it wholeheartedly enough. If we look back, we realize even this magical quality is not special to a history of class struggle, as whites during the New Negro movements of the early twentieth century felt that they were vanguard race leaders because they had putatively imbibed some essential qualities of Negroness by cross-identifying with the folk and their culture.

sought to pay the lowest price possible for this advantage.

**No solvency- Withdrawal and rejection empirically strengthen capitalism**

**Herod ‘07**(James, awesome theorist-character, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/5thEd/PrintEd.htm)

We cannot destroy capitalism by dropping out, either as an individual, a small group, or a community. It’s been tried over and over, and it fails every time. There is no escaping capitalism; there is nowhere left to go. The only escape from capitalism is to destroy it. Then we could be free (if we try). In fact, capitalists love it when we drop out. They don’t need us. They have plenty of suckers already. What do they care if we live under bridges, beg for meals, and die young? I haven’t seen the ruling class rushing to help the homeless. Even more illusory than the idea that an individual can drop out is the notion that a whole community can withdraw from the system and build its own little new world somewhere else. This was tried repeatedly by utopian communities throughout the nineteenth century. The strategy was revived in the 1960s as thousands of new left radicals retired to remote rural communes to groove on togetherness (and dope). The strategy is once again surfacing in the new age movement as dozens of communities are being established all over the country. These movements all suffer from the mistaken idea that they don’t have to attack capitalism and destroy it but can simply withdraw from it, to live their own lives separately and Independently. It is a vast illusion. Capitalists rule the world. Until they are defeated, there will be no freedom for anyone.

**They make capitalism worse**

**Zizek 12**, Senior Researcher University of Ljubljana, ’12 (Slavoj, October, “Capitalism: How the left lost the argument” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/08/capitalism)

One might think that a crisis brought on by rapacious, unregulated capitalism would have changed a few minds about the fundamental nature of the global economy. One would be wrong. True, there is no lack of anti-capitalist sentiment in the world today, particularly as a crisis brought on by the system's worst excesses continues to ravage the global economy. If anything, we are witnessing an **overload** of critiques of the horrors of capitalism: Books, newspaper investigations, and TV reports abound, telling us of companies ruthlessly polluting our environment, corrupted bankers who continue to get fat bonuses while their banks are bailed out by taxpayer money, and sweatshops where children work overtime. Yet no matter how grievous the abuse or how indicative of a larger, more systemic failure, **there's a limit to how far these critiques go**. The goal is invariably to democratize capitalism in the name of fighting excesses and to extend democratic control of the economy through the pressure of more media scrutiny, parliamentary inquiries, harsher laws, and honest police investigations. What is never questioned is the bourgeois state of law upon which modern capitalism depends. This remains the sacred cow that even the most radical critics from the likes of Occupy Wall Street and the World Social Forum dare not touch. It's no wonder, then, that the optimistic leftist expectations that the ongoing crisis would be a sobering moment -- the awakening from a dream -- turned out to be **dangerously shortsighted**. The year 2011 was indeed one of dreaming dangerously, of the revival of radical emancipatory politics all around the world. A year later, every day brings new proof of how fragile and inconsistent the awakening actually was. The enthusiasm of the Arab Spring is mired in compromises and religious fundamentalism; Occupy is losing momentum to such an extent that the police cleansing of New York's Zuccotti Park even seemed like a blessing in disguise. It's the same story around the world: Nepal's Maoists seem outmaneuvered by the reactionary royalist forces; Venezuela's "Bolivarian" experiment is regressing further and further into caudillo-run populism; and even the most hopeful sign, Greece's anti-austerity movement, has lost energy after the electoral defeat of the leftist Syriza party. It now seems that **the primary political effect of the economic crisis was not the rise of the radical left, but of racist populism, more wars, more poverty in the poorest Third World countries, and widening divisions between rich and poor**. For all that crises shatter people out of their complacency and make them question the fundamentals of their lives, the first spontaneous reaction is not revolution but **panic, which leads to a return to basics: food and shelter**. The core premises of the ruling ideology are not put into doubt. They are even more violently asserted. Could we in fact be seeing the conditions for the further radicalization of capitalism? German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk once told me that, if there is a person alive to whom they will build monuments 100 years from now, it is Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean leader who did more than anyone else to promote and implement the marriage of capitalism and authoritarianism -- an arrangement he euphemistically referred to as "Asian values." The virus of this authoritarian capitalism is slowly but surely spreading around the globe, nowhere more so than China. Faced with today's explosion of capitalism in China, analysts often ask when political democracy as the "natural" political accompaniment of capitalism will enforce itself. But what if the promised democratization never arrives? What if China's authoritarian capitalism is not a stop on the road to further democratization, but the end state toward which the rest of the world is headed? Leon Trotsky once characterized tsarist Russia as "the vicious combination of the Asian knout [whip] and the European stock market," but the description applies even better to today's China. In the Chinese iteration, the combination may prove to be a more stable one than the democratic capitalist model we have come to see as natural. The main victim of the ongoing crisis is thus not capitalism, which appears to be evolving into an even more pervasive and pernicious form, but democracy -- not to mention the left, whose **inability to offer a viable global alternative has again been rendered visible to all**. It was the left that **was effectively caught with its pants down**. It is almost as if this crisis were staged to demonstrate that **the only solution to a failure of capitalism is more capitalism.**